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Chapter 1
Introduction
In line with the trend in the OECD-area, the Nordic countries carried out base
broadening and rate cutting tax reforms in the early nineties. By introducing the
dual income tax! they went even further and in a different direction than previous
reforms in other countries. The dual income tax separates capital income from labor
income. In contrast to the global income tax, which levies one tax schedule on the
sum of income from all sources, the dual income tax combines a low proportional
tax on capital incomewith a progressive tax on other income, mostly labor income.
Later Belgium, France, Italy, and Japan also introduced versions of the dual income
tax and have separate tax schedules for labor income and interest income", This
constitutes a huge natural experiment which needs to be studied more closely to
draw lessons for future tax reforms.
The differential treatment of capital income and labor income under the dual
income tax has several justifications". First, the globalization of capital markets
limits the scope of national taxation ofmobile capital. Typically, labor is lessmobile
than capital and may be taxed at a higher rate without risking an erosion of the
tax base. Second, labor income constitutes the basis for future old age retirement
benefits, as well as present health care privileges. Third, capital enters into taxable
wealth. The efficienttax rate on capital incomeshould hence be viewedin connection
lThe dual income tax was introduced in Sweden 1991, Norway 1992, and Finland 1993. The
idea originated in Denmark, and was implemented in their 1985 tax reform. Later they introduced
a hybrid system, mostly due to redistributive concerns.
2See Fuest and Weichenrieder (2002).
3See Sørensen (1998) and (2001).
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with the wealth tax rate. Fourth, a lower tax on capital income stimulates personal
saving. The higher the capital income tax rate, the more the tax system favours
inpatient consumers who consumemost of their income today. Fifth, in the presence
of inflation, a low tax on some forms of capital income compensates for the fact that
the tax is levied on the nominal, and not the real return to capital. In addition to
this, the justification for keeping the tax on capital income proportional is that a
progressive tax on capital incomewould be highly exposed to avoidance.
The present study analyzes how the dual income tax affects the individuals'
optimal investment levels in financial and human capital. It also analyzes how the
dual income tax affects small firms' optimal investment levels in real and financial
capital, as well as the effect on their choice of organizational form.
One weaknessof the dual income tax is the distributional implications of the tax-
ation of small businesses. Income from self-employment and small businesses stems
partially from return to the labor effort put in by active owners, and partially from
the return to capital invested in the firm. For medium and high income classes, there
is a large differencein the marginal tax rates on capital and labor income, providing
large incentives for income shifting from labor income to capital income in order
to minimize tax payments". Owners of small businesses can easily reduce taxation
by reducing their own wage payments and increase dividend payments. To prevent
this, the dual income tax countries have implemented different versions of a "split"
system of dual income taxation for self-employedentrepreneurs and corporations
owned by the employees. Under this split system, one part of firm profits is taxed
as capital income and the remaining profits are taxed as labor income. Chapter 1
analyzes how the Norwegiansplit model encourages small firms to participate in tax
minimizing income shifting, which affects both the level of real capital in the firm
as well as their preferred type of organizational form.
Higher education can be viewed both as a consumption good for which the in-
dividual is willing to pay, and as an investment alternative that yields higher wages
later in life. The factors determining the individual's educational choice can be
divided into three groups: preferences, returns, and costs. The costs of attending
higher education are effort, time and money, both direct monetary outlays and fore-
gone labor income. The return to higher education comes both as pecuniary and
4At present, the difference in the top marginal tax rates on labor income and capital income is
37.3 percentage points in Norway, including social security contributions.
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non-pecuniary returns. ABhigher education increases the skill level and thus also
the productivity of the individual, he is paid a higher wage in the labor market.
Also, higher skilled individuals qualify for different types of jobs than lower skilled
individuals. High-skilledjobs often offer various fringe benefits, which are not paid
as money, but which all are equivalent to a wage increase. Fringe benefits and the
wage premium constitute the pecuniary return to higher education. The individual
specific non-pecuniary return to higher education is the consumption value of edu-
cation, which is defined in chapter 4. The consumption value of education is a tax
free return to education. Chapter 2 and 3 analyze how the tax system affects the
individual's educational choice in the presence of such a tax exempt consumption
value, both regarding the optimal length and type of education.
Chapter 2:
The Sole Proprietor's Income Shifting Under
the Dual Income Tax.
The dual income tax provides the sole proprietor with large incentives to partic-
ipate in tax minimizing income shifting to have more of his income taxed as capital
income. The Norwegian split model is designed to remove these incentives, but it
contains loopholes. This analysis concludes that the split model counteracts the neg-
ative effectsof the risk of a technology shock on the sole proprietor's investments in
firm specificreal capital. It actually induces the sole proprietor to over-invest in less
risky real capital. Real capital investment becomes a device for shifting income from
the labor income tax base to the capital income tax base and thus reduces total
tax payments of the sole proprietor. The incentives to participate in tax minimizing
income shifting increase as his income increases. Thus, the incentives to over-invest
in firm specificreal capital provided by the net risk compensation rate, may increase
as the labor income tax rate increases.
In addition, the widely held corporation serves as a tax shelter for high income
entrepreneurs. The higher his income, and the larger the difference between the
tax rates on labor income and capital income, the larger the incentives to become
a widely held corporation in order to escape the split model and reduce total tax
payments. Only low-incomeentrepreneurs have incentives to stay under the split
model in order to enjoy the forwarding of negative imputed return to labor and
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deduct this against future positive imputed return to labor. The prediction of the
model is supported by actually observed behavior of sole proprietorships after the
introduction of the dual income tax and the split model in Norway in 1992.
Chapter 3:
Does the Tax System Encourage Too Much Education?
This paper provides an efficiency argument in favour of progressive labor income
taxation. An individual who faces two investment alternatives, financial capital and
human capital, invests in both until their net marginal returns are equal. Foregone
labor income is the only cost of getting education. A proportional labor income
tax is then a neutral tax on the return to human capital investments and does not
alter its marginal return. Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) show that the dual income
tax system with proportional tax on capital income and progressive tax on labor
income is optimal in a second-best world. With a positive tax on capital income,
a proportional tax on labor income leads to an over-investment in human capital.
A progressive labor income tax reduces the marginal return to education, and the
distortions in the investment market are reduced. If education in addition to being
an investment alternative also is a consumption good, this has consequences for the
optimal tax policy. A positive consumption value of education is a tax-free return
to human capital investments. Hence a proportional labor income tax no longer is
a neutral tax on the return to human capital investments. Even when no tax is
levied on capital income, a progressive tax on labor income is required to reduce the
overinvestment in education.
Chapter 4:
Income Tax, Consumption Value of Education,
and the Choice of Educational Type.
Economists have thoroughly discussed how the tax system might affect the in-
dividual's educational level. But the question of how the tax system affects the
individual's choice of educational type has been mostly ignored. Even if education is
mostly treated as homogenous in the economic literature, it is in fact a heterogenous
investment alternative and consumption good. Different kinds of education generate
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different levels of consumption value, as well as different levels of wage return. De-
pending on their preferences, individuals put different weight on the consumption
value when choosing educational type. The return to education is one motivation.
behind an individual's educational choice.The consumption value is a tax free return
to education. This paper finds that a progressive tax system induces the individual
to choose more of the educational type with the higher consumption value. This
effect is stronger the more weight he puts on the present.
Chapter 5:
Measuring the Consumption Value of Higher Education.
This paper argues for the existence of an individual specific consumption value
of education, both during the education and after its completion, and for which
the individual is willing to pay. A method for measuring the willingness to pay for
the consumption value of education, where the innate ability bias is corrected for,
is suggested in a compensating differentials framework. The identification strategy
is to compare two individuals who attended teacher's college and business school
in Norway during the 1960's. In this period these two types of education required
the same minimum average grade level from high school for admittance, but they
generated very different wage returns. The wage return from attending business
school in this period is used as a benchmark for the potential wage return of the
teacher's collegegraduates.
Using the Norwegian 1970 census, cross section wage profiles are estimated for
those business school and teacher's collegegraduates with different levelsofworking
experience. These wage profiles are interpreted as the expected future wages of the
individuals attending business school and teacher's college during the 1960's. The
individual who attended teacher's college in Norway during the 1960's expected to
start his first job with annual earnings 34.7% below his potential earnings. The full
ex-ante price for the consumption value of teacher's collegeis estimated to be 38 %
of the present value of the individual's potentiallifetime income.
Utilizing a full coverage panel data set on the Norwegian population it is esti-
mated that in fact the teacher's collegegraduates started up their first job earning
"only" 20.6% less than the business school graduates. But these wage differentials
increased over time. The ex-post price on the consumption value to teacher's college
5
during the 1960's turned out to be about 46 % of the present value of the individuals'
potential lifetime income.
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Chapter 2
The Sole Proprietor's Income Shifting Under the
Dual Income Tax*
Abstract
The dual income tax provides the sole proprietor with large incentives to
participate in tax minimizing income shifting to have more of his income taxed
as capital income. The Norwegian split model is designed to remove these
incentives, but it contains loopholes. The present paper concludes that the
split model to some extent counteracts the negative effect of technology risk
on the level of real capital in the sole proprietorship. But the split model also
induces the sole proprietor to over-invest in less risky real capital. In addition,
the widely held corporation serves as a tax shelter for the sole proprietor. The
higher the business income and the higher the difference between the marginal
tax rates on labor and capital, the larger the incentives to incorporate.
JEL-classifications: H24; H25; H32.
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1 Introduction
In line with the trend in the OECD-area, the Nordic countries carried out base
broadening and rate cutting tax reforms in the early nineties. By introducing the
dual income tax! they went even further and in a different direction than previous
reforms in other countries. The dual income tax separates capital income from labor
income. In contrast to the global income tax, which levies one tax schedule on the
sum of income from all sources, the dual income tax combines a low proportional
tax on capital income with a progressive tax on other income, mostly labor income.
Later Belgium, France, Italy, and Japan also introduced versions of the dual income
tax and have separate tax schedules for labor income and interest income''. This
constitutes a huge natural experiment from which lessons are to be drawn for future
tax reforms.
One weakness of the dual income tax is the distributional implications of the
taxation of entrepreneurs and small businesses. Income from self-employment and
small businesses stems partially from return to the labor effort put in by the active
owner, and partially from the return to capital invested in the firm. For medium and
high income classes, there is a large difference in the marginal tax rates on capital
and labor income", providing large incentives for income shifting from labor income
to capital income in order to minimize tax payments. Owners of small businesses can
easily do this by reducing their own wage payments and increase dividend payments,
in order to maximize net income. In the extreme case, all individuals would start
own businesses in order to participate in this tax arbitrage. To prevent this, the
Nordic countries have implemented different versions of a "split" system of dual
income taxation for sole proprietors and closely held corporations. Under this split
system, one part of a firm's profits is taxed as capital income and the remaining
profits are taxed as labor income.
The Norwegian split model of dual income taxation applies to sole proprietorships
and closely held corporations. A corporation is defined as closely held if 2/3 or more
lThe dual income tax was introduced in Sweden in 1991, Norway 1992, and Finland 1993. The
idea originated in Denmark, and was implemented in their 1985 tax reform. Later they introduced
a hybrid system, mostly due to redistributive concerns.
2See Fuest and Weichenrieder (2002).
3At present, the difference in the top marginal tax rates on labor income and capital income is
37.3 percentage points in Norway, including social security contributions.
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of the shares are held by active! owners. A corporation is defined as widely held if
less than 2/3 of the shares are held by active owners, and it is then taxed according
to corporate tax rules. The split model was introduced at the end of a depression,
and a period of strong economic expansion followed. In the years after the tax
reform, the number of sole proprietors decreased, while the number of corporations
increased. Does this mean that the split model discourages entrepreneurship, or does
it mean that the activity of the entrepreneurs is unchanged, while their preferred
organizational form has changed"? Also, the share of corporations being closely
held decreased from 52% in 1992, to 32% in 2000.Which factors make this type of
behavior rational? The present paper studies the tax induced distortions in a small
firm's investment decision and choice of organizational form in a theoretical model,
and three questions are asked. First, which are the sole proprietor's determinants for
incorporating? Second, which are the sole proprietors' incentives to invest in risky
real capital under the split model?And third, which are the widelyheld corporations'
incentives to invest in risky real capital? But before these questions are answered
in the specific case considered in this paper, let us take a closer look at the tax
literature.
The tax code's effect on the firm's choicebetween debt and equity, as well as the
choice of whether to retain or distribute earnings are thoroughly discussed in the
literature. See for instance Gentry (1994). Different levelsof corporate and personal
tax rates provide private investorswith incentives to use corporations as a tax shelter
to save their capital incomefromhigh personal tax rates, a point highlighted by Fuest
and Weichenrieder (2002).
The combination of a low corporate tax rate and a high personal income tax
rate provides managers with incentives to relabel labor income as capital income,
effectively reducing their tax on salaries, an effect identified empirically on Nor-
wegian micro data by Fjærli and Lund (2001)6.But this income shifting may not
be optimal if the individual has a long-term horizon. By receiving wages, he pays
4An owner is characterised as active if he works more than 300 hours annually in the firm. Close
family members of active owners are not recognized as passive owners by the tax authorities.
5Slemrod (2001) states that in many cases, what appear to be real effects of tax changes are in
fact only the result of creative re-labelling activity by the individuals, and this needs to be carefully
considered when evaluating the effects of a tax reform.
6This study utilizes rich micro data from 1991, a year prior to the full implementation of the
1992 tax reform. Hence the split model does not apply here.
9
higher taxes, but he also becomes entitled to future pension payments from the
public sector. Dividends do not entitle him to future pension. If the individual cares
about his retirement, it might.be optimal to pay more wages than the short-term
tax minimization predicts, and Fjærli and Lund also document the presence of this
effect.
There is an endogeneity of a firm's tax system: by changing organizational form
the firm can experience a shift in the taxes it faces. Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1989,
1993) started a new strand of the literature on the firm's choice of organizational
form following a tax reform that altered the relative tax rates on personal and
corporate income. If corporate tax rates increase relative to personal tax rates, this
reduces the firm's incentives to incorporate, and vice versa. Empirical support for
this is presented by Goolsbee (1998), Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1990, 1994), and
MacKie-Masonand Gordon (1997).
Non-tax factors also play an important role in the firm's choiceof organizational
form, as Ayers et al. (1996) thoroughly discuss. Business risk and default risk are
factors that work in favor of the corporate organizational form. The sole proprietor
carries all risk himself and is personally responsible for all claims. In case of a
bankruptcy he may be liable to pay damages beyond the capital he has invested
in the firm. In a corporation, the individual shareholder has limited liability and
may in case of a bankruptcy lose at most the capital he has invested in the firm.
The higher the relative risk of the operation, the more likely the business will be
organized as a corporation. Another important factor is the opportunity to raise
new capital. A corporation may issue new shares and might more easily raise new
capital than the self-employedentrepreneur. Also, size does matter. As firms become
large, ownersare more likely to hire professionalmanagers and become less directly
involved in management decisions. Similarly, the higher the number of owners in
a firm, the higher the probability of conflict among them. Then conflicts may be
minimized by choosing the corporate form with a more formal ownership structure.
The sole proprietor has full controlover the activity and strategy of his firm. This
might change if he organizes as a corporation with passive shareholders who have
strong opinions on how the firm should be run.
The incentives to income shifting under the dual income tax are particularly
strong for smaller, often family owned firms. The different Nordic countries have
differentwaysof solvingthese incomeshifting problems. Lindhe et al. (2002)analyze
lC
the effectsof the different Nordic split models on the long-run cost of capital. They
find that while in Sweden the cost of capital is the same in closely and widely
held corporations, the Finnish system reduces the long-run cost of capital in closely
held corporations. The effect of the Norwegian system depends on the size of the
imputation rate. Oberg (2003) extends the analysis of Lindhe et al. to find how the
cost of capital is affected by the source of finance under the different Nordic split
models. Kari (1999) analyzes the effects of mainly the Finnish split modelon the
splitting of dividend income from a closelyheld firm into capital and earned income
parts. He concludesthat the distortions imposedby the split model are very sensitive
to the tax system's definition of the capital base of the firm. Risk is not included
in any of these three papers. Sannarnes (1995) analyzes how the Norwegian split
model in the presence of risk affects the investment behavior of external investors
when deciding to invest in a closely or widely held corporation. He concludes that
the split model encourages more investments in the closely held corporation.
The analysis in the present paper concludesthat the split model counteracts the
negative effectsof the risk of a technologyshock on the sole proprietor's investments
in firm specificreal capital. It actually induces the sole proprietor to over-invest in
less risky real capital, relative to the optimal investment level in the absence of
taxation. Real capital investment becomes a device for shifting income from the
labor income tax base to the capital income tax base and thus reduces total tax
payments of the sole proprietor. The incentives to participate in tax minimizing
income shifting increase as his income increases. The net risk compensation rate
under the split model is higher the higher the labor income tax rate, and thus the
incentives to over-investin firm specificreal capital may increase as the labor income
tax rate increases.
In addition, the widely held corporation serves as a tax shelter for high income
entrepreneurs. The higher his income, and the larger the difference between the
tax rates on labor income and capital income, the larger the incentives to become
a widely held corporation in order to escape the split model and reduce total tax
payments. Only low-incomeentrepreneurs have incentives to stay under the split
model in order to enjoy the forwarding of negative imputed return to labor and
deduct this against future positive imputed return to labor. The prediction of the
model is supported by actually observed behavior of sole proprietorships after the
introduction of the dual income tax and the split model in Norway in 1992.
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Section 2 describes the Norwegian version of the split model of dual income
taxation in detail. Section 3 presents the model, and sections 4 and 5 analyze the
effect of the split modelon the self-employed and the incorporated entrepreneur's
investment portfolio. Section 6 compares the two organizational forms, and section
7 presents empirical evidence. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Norwegian split model
The Norwegian tax reform of 1992 implemented the dual income tax in a purer form
than all the other Nordic countries. When considering how to solve the problems of a
consistent tax treatment of small businesses, the split model of dual income taxation
was chosen, separating income from different sources. Under the split model, an
imputed return to the capital invested in the firm is calculated by multiplying the
value of the capital assets" by a fixed rate of return on capital", The imputed return
to capital is taxed at the corporate rate, which equals the capital income tax rate at
the individual level, Business profits net of imputed capital return? are the imputed
return to labor, which is taxed as labor income whether the wages are actually paid
to the owner or not. This reduces the possibility for the sole proprietor to classify
all income as capital income in order to reduce taxes. If imputed labor income is
negative, the loss does not offset other income, but may be carried forward to be
deducted against future imputed labor income.
By exaggerating the capital assets of the firm, the sole proprietor achieves a re-
duction in the imputed labor income, and reduces his tax payments. This may be
done in several ways, for instance by shifting from leased to owned'? premises and
machinery, by increasing stocks at the end of the year, by increasing and extending
customers' trade receivables at the end of the year, and by financing private durable
7These assets include physical business capital, acquired good-will and other intangible assets,
business inventories, and credit extended to customers net of debt to the firm's supplyers.
8This rate of return on capital is set anually by the Parliament on the basis of the average rate
of return on government bonds (5% in 2000) pluss a risk premium (5% in 2000).
9If the firm has employees in addition to the owner's), a salary deduction of 12% of the wage
bill from taxable wage payments applies before the return to the owner's labor effort is imputed.
IOThere is an offsetting shift of ownership regarding former owners of leased assets. Presum-
ably there will be a clientele effect where assets are owned by sole proprietors and closely held
corporations.
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goods in the firm. Acquired good-will is very hard for the tax authorities to value,
and overstating this and other parts of firm capital reduces the imputed labor in-
come. Also.. by letting the firm invest in durable private consumption goods such
as boats, cars, holiday homes, etc. the owner increases his consumption and reduces
tax payments. Even if the increased wealth tax due on the value of capital assets is
taken into account this strategy is lucrative for the sole proprietor!", It can even be
profitable to borrow in the financial market to invest in business capital. Such debts
are private and entitle the borrower to tax allowances.
But the largest loophole in the split system is probably at the margin, the ques-
tion of whether a firm is subject to the split model at all. By incorporating and
selling more than one-third'? of the shares to passive investors, firms can avoid be-
ing taxed according to the split system. The widely held corporation is free to pay
its active owners as little wage and as much dividends as it likes. This technique is
especially attractive for individuals in "liberal" professions, such as lawyers, medical
doctors and dentists. These are typically professions with little capital required to
run a business, and the imputed labor income is accordingly high. As a widely held
corporation they may take out all the compensation for their own labor effort as
dividends.
3 The model
For simplicity, the following analysis abstracts from many of the details discussed
above. Consider a utility maximizing entrepreneurial individual who lives for two
periods and who is about to start a business. He needs to decide how much to invest
in real capital in the firm, which has a stochastic second period return, as well as
which organizational form to choose. As a sole proprietor he is taxed under the
11Assume that the sole propriertor increases his investments by NOK 100. At the going rate his
imputed return to capital increases with NOK 10, which means that the imputed return to labor
income is reduced by the same amount. Assuming that he is in the top wage income bracket, this
increased investment reduces his personal taxes by NOK 5.2. The increased return to capital is
subject to taxation on firm level at 28 per cent. In addition he is subject to a wealth tax of 1.1 per
cent on total wealth. His taxes on firm level hence increase by NOK 3.9. Even when the increased
wealth tax is taken into consideration, it still pays off to engage in this kind of income shifting.
12This is given by the tax code. Widely held corporations are not taxed under teh split model,
and these are defined as corporations where passive owners hold more than one third of the shares.
13
split model. As a widely held corporation he is subject to corporate tax rules, but is
required to pay a part of dividends to passive shareholders. Individuals differ in their
preferences ofwhich is.the preferred organizational form. Here consider the marginal
entrepreneur who initially has no intrinsic value of either of the two organizational
forms, and who chooses the organizational form that maximizes his utility.
The individual has a given time endowment in both periods, which he spends
working in his firm and enjoying leisure. In order to study the individual's invest-
ment decision and the choiceof organizational form separately from his labor supply
decision, assume that total time spent working in the firm is given. The remaining
leisure is hence also given. A change of organizational form in order to reduce tax
payments is only a re-labelling of the existing nature of the sole proprietor's activ-
ity, and he puts in the same amount of labor in the two cases. But the change of
organizational form could nevertheless change the return to working, since it affects
the net return to entrepreneurial activity in the presence of taxes.
Expected utility. The individual's expected utility function is represented by
EU = u(C1) + E (v (C2)1, (1)
which has positive and decreasingmarginal utilities of both first period consumption,
Cb and second period consumption, C2, such that
U'(C1) > 0, U"(C1) < 0, V' (C2) > 0, and v" (C2) < O.
The risk averse individual chooses the investment portfolio and organizational
form that maximize his lifetime utility.
Investments and income. In the first period he has initial wealth Y, which he
allocates to investing in risky real capital K in the firm, and savingB in the financial
market. Investments in the financial market yield the exogenously given safe real
rate of return T. Savings may be negative, and then the individual borrows in the
financial market. Loans are repaid in full in the second period. The gross return
to real capital investments is the sales income net of the real capital depreciation,
which is represented by the shock-related depreciation rate ;y and discussed more
closely below. The net of taxes sales income depends on the tax regime and thus on
the chosenorganizational form. Itwill be specifiedseparately for each organizational
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form in the two following sections, as will the expressions for first and second period
consumption.
The entrepreneur is the only person employed in the firm, and thus labor as a
production factor is fixed. The firm produces one type of product, which is sold in
the second period at a given price set to unity, P = 1. The production level X varies
according to the amount of capital, K, invested in the firm, and sales income is thus
given by the production function
X =F(K).
The production function has a positive and decreasing marginal product of capital;
FK > Oand FKK < o.
Risk. The individual invests in real capital in the first period, and he realizes all his
capital in the second period. The second period sales value of the capital stock of the
firm depends on the depreciation rate, which is given by the stochastic parameter j.
There will always be some depreciation, and the maximum loss through depreciation
is the initial value of the real capital, such that
O<;Y<1.
The expected value of the depreciation is positive and given by the ordinary depre-
ciation rate o:
E [;y] = o> o. (2)
The individual demands a risk premium in order to invest in real capital in the
firm. First define e as the rate of return to real capital required to compensate
the individual for the relative expected second period marginal utility reduction
caused by the depreciation. The size of e depends on two factors; the individuals
preferences regarding risk, as well as the probability of a technology shock changing
the real capital depreciation dramatically:
(3)
A higher probability of a technology shock increases the expected depreciation rate o.
Also, the real capital depreciation reduces the second period consumption. The more
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risk averse the individual is, the larger is the utility loss from the drop in second
period consumption. Thus the covariance of the shock parameter and the second
period marginal utility is positive and higher the more risk averse the individual is.
Define the risk premium as
A = cov [v' ((;'z) ,::y] O
- E[v'(Cz)J >. (4)
Taxes. Let tw be the proportional tax rate on labor incomeand tk the proportional
tax rate on capital income.We simplify by assuming that the tax on labor income is
proportional, when in fact it is progressive in most countries, including the countries
with a dual income tax. But one might think of this tax as the top marginal tax rate
on labor income. The progressive labor income tax schedule is then in fact "flat on
the top". Assume that the tax rate on labor income is higher than that on capital
income, tw > tk. Total tax payments are given by T. No wealth tax is present in the
model.
4 Sole proprietorship
Let the subscript "s" denote the previously described variables when the entrepre-
neur is a sole proprietor. First period consumption is given as the initial wealth net
of investments:
Cl,. = y - K. - Bs- (5)
The sole proprietor owns the firm and has full disposal over total sales income. His
gross second period incomeconsists of the return to his entrepreneurial investments,
which are the sales income F(K.), as well as the return to his investments in the
financial market and the invested capital, [1+ rJ . Bs- Also, the real capital is cap-
italized in the second period, and the market value is reduced by the stochastic
depreciation: [1- ::y] . K s- Thus the net of taxes second period income is given by
Cz,. = F(K.) + [1 -::y] . K. + [1+ rJ· B. - T•.
The imputation rate. The sole proprietor would, if he could and ceteris paribus,
have all income taxed as capital income. The tax authorities assign a part of the
income as a return to the capital invested, and the residual as a return to labor,
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which is taxed as labor income.When assigning the part of the income to be taxed
at the capital income tax rate, a return to real capital in the firm is imputed at a
fixed imputation rate ri of the total value of the finn real capital at the beginning
of the period13. The subscript "i" refers to "imputed" .
The imputation rate is set by the authorities, ar..dit is the sum of the average
return to government bonds, r, and a risk compensation factor, /1, such that ri =
r + /1. The risk compensation factor supposedly acknowledgesthe fact that the
entrepreneur takes a risk by investing in real capital in the firm and hence loses
the possibility of risk diversificationin the financial market. The government's risk
compensation is the same for all types of firms and all types of real capital.
Tax payments and the individual's budget constraint Capital income tax
is paid on the imputed return to invested capital, [r + /1] . Ks. Labor income tax
is paid on the imputed return to labor, which is the value of the production net
of production costs (which are here the ordinary and shock-related depreciation
rates) and the imputed return to invested capital'", In addition, capital income tax
is paid on interest income from the investments in bonds. Total taxes due for the
self-employedare thus given by
The second period incomeof the sole proprietor, C2,s, can then be written as:
C2,s = [1 - tw]· [F(Ks) - ;y . Ks]
+ {I + (tw - tk) . (r + /1)} . Ks + [1+ (1 - tk) . r] . Bs
(6)
The first part of the right hand side of (6) represents the individual's net of taxes
income from his firm if all income were taxed as labor income. But the imputed
return to capital is actually taxed as capital income,which increases his net income
13When the split model was first introduced, the self-employed individual could choose whether
the value at the beginning or at the end of the period should be used in the imputation of the
return to firm capital. Later this changed, and at the present, the average of the values of firm
capital at the beginning and at the end of the period should be used to impute the return to firm
capital. The first specification is chosen for this paper.
14rr the imputed labor income exceeds a given threshold, which in 1993 was NOK 1.25 Million,
the remainder is taxed as capital income. Assume in this analysis that the imputed labor income
is always below this threshold.
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by a fraction (tw - tk) of total imputed return to capital. The larger the difference
between the marginal tax rates on labor income and capital income, the more at-
tractive .it is to participate in income shifting activities in order .to have more of his
income taxed as capital income. But this is only relevant if in fact he pays labor
income taxes. Thus assume that the sole proprietor at least expects to have positive
profits in the firm.
The individual chooses the investment portfolio that maximizes his expected
utility.
4.1 The investmentportfolio.
The sole proprietor's optimization problem is given by
where Cl,s and C2,s are given by equations (5) and (6). The resulting first order
conditions are given by
(7)
-u'(CI,s) + E [v'(C2,s)' {1+ (1- tk) . r}l = O
(8)
POCK. : -u'(CI,s) + E [V'(C2,S) . { [1- twl' [PK. -::Yl }] = o.
+ [tw - tkl . [r + ILl + 1
The optimal investment condition is found by combining the two first order
conditions, as well as applying the definition of the risk premium As :
t - tk
FK• = r + 8+ As - -1w • IL·-tw (9)
The sole proprietor invests in real capital in the firm until the value of the mar-
ginal product equals the risk adjusted user cost of capital. The higher the expected
depreciation rate, and the higher risk premium the individual demands, the higher is
the user cost of capital, and the lower is the optimallevel of real capital investments
in the firm. This effect is counteracted by the risk compensation factor, IL, which
isolated considered works as a government subsidy on real capital investments. The
total risk compensation under the split model is the relative after tax risk compensa-
tion rate, ti_~:.IL. Thus even if the risk compensation factor IL is constant over time,
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a tax change will change the net risk compensation, and thus also the investment
incentives of the sole proprietor. The net risk compensation is larger the bigger the
difference between. the two marginal tax rates, and the higher the tax rate on labor
income.
In the special case that As = ti_~~. J.L the individual is fully compensated for
the risk of investing in real capital in the firm, and he invests in real capital as he
would in the absence of both risk and taxes. Then the optimal investment condition
reduces to the Fisher condition, FKs = r + o.
On the other hand, if As > ti"_~~. J.L, the risk compensation under the split model
is too small to compensate the individual for the risk he is exposed to by investing
in real capital. But the split model still counteracts the negative effect on the level
of entrepreneurial investments in the society from the risk of technology shock, and
the sole proprietor invests more in real capital in the firm than in the absence of
taxes.
The sole proprietor is overcompensated for the risk he is exposed to if As <
7_~:k. J.L. In that case the sole proprietor will use real capital investments as a means
to shift income from labor income to capital income. The split model induces the
sole proprietor to over-invest in less risky types of real capital, in order to minimize
tax payments. This effect is larger the less risk averse the sole proprietor is.
In the present model, the net risk compensation rate is constant, as long as none
of the parameters is changed. This is due to the simplifying assumption of the labor
income tax rate being constant. But under the dual income tax, the marginal tax
rate on labor income increases as the income increases, while the capital income tax
rate is constant. Thus the net risk compensation rate under the split model increases
as the imputed labor income of the sole proprietor increases. This means that high
income sole proprietors have greater incentives to participate in this tax minimizing
income shifting by increasing real capital investments. In the context of this model,
though, only one individual is considered, and the labor income tax rate is assumed
to be independent of income level.
4.2 The effect of tax changes on investment behavior.
Tax reforms change the investment incentives of the sole proprietor. Below, the
effects of changes in both the labor income tax and the capital income tax rate are
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analyzed through comparative static analysis of the first order conditions (7) and
(8). The effects of tax changes in the sole proprietor's real capital investments can
be expressed as a twofold effect, .both an income effect and a substitution effect.
It can be shownl'' that if vl//(C2,s) > 0, then the income effect ~ is positive if
COV[V"(C2,s),::y)· E[v'(C2,s)] < cov[v'(C2,s),;;Y]· E[V"(C2,s)]. On the other hand, if
VIll(C2,s) < 0, then ~ is negative.
4.2.1 Labor income tax.
The effect of a labor income tax increase on the level of real capital in the sole
proprietorship is given by
(10)
_ {F(Ks) - (r + J.L) • Ks + [1+ (1 _ tk) .-l E [V"(C2,s) . ;;y] . K } . BKs
[1+ (1- tk) . r] U"(C1,s) s BY
+U"(C1,s) + [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2 . E [V"(C2,s)]
[1- tw]· D· E [v'(C2,s)]
l[1 - t ]2. K . { E [V"(C
2,s) .;;Y.::y) . E [v'(C2,s)] } l
w s -E [v'(C2,s) .::y) . E [V"(C2,s) .::y). ,
- [1 - tk]· J.L. E [v'(C2,s)]2
where D is positive and defined in the mathematical appendix.
Whether this tax induces the sole proprietor to increase or decrease his invest-
ments in firm specific real capital depends on whether the substitution effect or the
total income effect is stronger. This again depends on the individual's preferences.
The first component of (10) is the total income effect, where the sign is determined by
~. The second component is the substitution effect, where the sign is determined
by the expressions in the parenthesis.
Above we stated that if the individual has decreasing absolute risk aversion,
then ~ > 0, and thus the total income effect is negative. The increased tax on
labor income reduces his net income, and thus he is less willing to invest in risky
15See the appendix for the formal deduction.
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capital. It can be shown'" that in this case the substitution effect is positive if
eau [V"(C2,s)· ::y,::y]. E [v'(C2,s)] < eau [v'(C2,s),::Y] . E [V"(C2,s)· ::y]. The higher the
tax on labor income, the greater the difference between the two tax rates, and the
higher is the private return to shifting income from the labor income tax base to
the capital income tax base by increasing the capital stock in the firm. Also, as the
net return to these types of investments increase, so does the relative after tax risk
compensation rate t'(_~~ . IL (as defined in equation 9), making the individual more
willing to invest in risky firm specific real capital. Therefor, the increased tax on
labor income induces the individual to increase his investments in firm specific real
capital if the substitution effect dominates the income effect!".
This whole effect is driven by the fact that the relative after tax risk compensation
rate is higher than the risk premium required by the individual to invest in risk real
capital. This is the case for less risky types of real capital, and these are typically the
types used as means to shift income from the labor income tax base to the capital
income tax base. The relative risk compensation rate is the same independently of
type of real capital. It depends positivelyon the difference between the marginal
tax rates on labor income and capital income, as well on the risk compensation rate
under the split model. In the absence of risk, the risk compensation rate IL ought to
be zero, since it otherwise distorts the investment decision of the sole proprietor.
All real capital is owned by the firm in this model, and in order to benefit from the
possibility to reduce tax payments through increased investments, the entrepreneur
must increase the total level of real capital in the firm. On the other hand, if parts
of the real capital were leased, the entrepreneur could purchase this real capital and
still have the same level of expenses, just switching from having to pay lease to
paying interest on a loan. This manoeuvre would leave the level of firm real capital
unchanged, and it would reduce the entrepreneur's tax payments. No wealth tax is
present in this model, and in this framework the presence of a wealth tax would not
alter the split-model's distortions to the investment portfolio of the entrepreneur.
Increased investments in real capital mean reduced investments in financial capital
and do not increase the wealth tax liability.
16See the mathematical appendix for the proof.
17On the other hand, if the individual has increasing absolute risk aversion, the total income
effect is positive and the substitution effect is negative. In that case the increased labor income tax
rate only induces the individual to increase his investments in risky real capital if the total income
effect dominates the substitution effect.
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4.2.2 Capital incometax.
The effect of an increase in the capital income tax rate on the level of real capital
in the sole proprietorship is unambiguously negative:
(11)
_ {[r + fL]' Ks + r· Bs _ r- E [V'(C2,S)]} . åKs
1+ (1- tk) . r U" (Cl,s) åY
When the capital income tax rate increases, the incentives to participate in any
kind of income shifting decrease, since the difference (tw - tk) decreases, as does the
private gain from income shifting. Also, increased capital income tax rate means a
decreased net risk compensation rate under the split model. Both factors induce the
sole proprietor to invest less in risky real capital in the firm. The higher the sole
proprietor's capital income is, the larger share of his total income is affected by the
tax increase, and the more is his net income reduced.
4.3 The indirect utility function.
The investment portfolio [Rs, Bs] maximizes the sole proprietor's expected utility.
Thus his maximum achievable level of expected utility, Eus, is given by the indirect
utility function:
(12)
where
Y - ic, - Bs
and
82,s = [1- tw]' [F(Rs) -;y. Rs] + {l+ [tw - tk]' [r + fL]}' k, (14)
(13)
This will be applied in the analysis of the entrepreneur's choice of organizational
form.
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5 The widely held corporation
The only reason for the individual to incorporate is to reduce his total tax burden by
escaping the split model. A closely held corporation would still be subject to the split
model, so in this context he has no incentive for choosing that organizational form.
Assume thus that the alternative to being a sole proprietor is to organize as a widely
held corporation with the minimum required number of pessive'" shareholders, (1-
(3), where 0< (3 < 1 is the active owner's maximum allowed share of ownership as a
widely held corporation. The entrepreneurial individual receives revenue from selling
shares in his firm to external investors. This can be modelled as a corresponding
reduction in the amount of real capital investment required by the individual. The
entrepreneurial individual invests the share (3 of total real capital, and the passive
shareholders invest the rest. Assume that the passive shareholder is not more risk
averse than the active shareholder, such that the risk premium required by the
passive investor is equal to or less than that of the active shareholder.
All shareholders receive dividend payments as a return to their invested capital.
The shareholder majority, which here means the entrepreneur, decides what wage to
pay the active shareholder as a compensation for his labor effort, as well as how much
to pay in dividends. Since an additional pay-roll tax applies to all wage payments
made by the corporation, the total tax burden on labor income is higher under the
corporate tax regime than under the split model. Hence it is irrational for the tax
minimizing entrepreneur to receive any wages as compensation for his own labor
efforts. All firm profits are paid as dividends in the second period, of which the
entrepreneurial individual receives (3 and the passive shareholders (1 - (3).
The widely held corporation considered here is typically a smaller, often family
owned corporation, whose objective it is to maximize the utility of the active share-
holder. This is in contrast to the larger corporations listed on the stock exchange
that usually are described in the optimal tax literature, whose goal it is to maximize
the stock value of the corporation.
In the following, use the same variables as previously described in the paper,
with the subscript" I" denoting the variables when the entrepreneur organizes as a
widely held corporation.
18In this model all shareholders are passive, except for the entrepreneur.
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First and second period consumption. First period consumption is given by
(15)
No wages are paid, and thus the net sales income is defined as firm profits, which are
taxed at the corporate tax rate tk at firm level. Then all net profits are distributed
tax free to the owners, of which the active shareholder receives {3. The firm specific
real capital is capitalized in the second period, and the sales value depends on
the stochastic depreciation. In addition, the entrepreneurial individual receives the
net of taxes return to his investments in the financial market. His second period
consumption is given by
C2,1 = (3 . [1 - tk]· [P(Kl) -;:y. Kl] + {3. Kl + [1+ (1 - tk) . r]· BI. (16)
5.1 The optimal investment condition.
The entrepreneur's optimization problem is given by
maxEUI = U(Cl,l) + E [v (C2,1)]
K"B,
where Cl,1 and C2,1 are given by equations (15) and (16). The resulting first order
conditions are given by
(17)
-U'(Cl,l) + [1 + (1 - tk) . r]· E [V'(C2,1)] = O
(18)
POCK, : -(3. U'(Cl,l) + E [V'(C2,1) . {{3. [1 - tk]· [PKI -;:y] + {3}] = O
Combining the first order conditions yields the optimal investment condition:
(19)
Real capital is invested in the firm until the value of the marginal product equals
the risk adjusted cost of capital. ABlong as external investors are not more risk averse
than the active shareholder, and as long as their alternative return is the interest
rate r, there will always be sufficient passive shareholders that want to invest in
the firm. Everything else equal, the optimal level of real capital in the widely held
24
corporation is lower than in the sole proprietorship. This is due to the fact that the
corporation does not experience any risk compensation through the tax system, as
the sole proprietor does.
The more risk averse the entrepreneur, and the higher the expected depreciation
rate, the less real capital is invested in the firm. Taxes have an indirect effect on
the level of real capital in the widely held corporation since only the risk premium
is affected through taxes. The extent to which the capital income tax affects the
investment level in the firm is studied in detail below. Labor income tax changes
have no effect on the investment behavior of the firm, since no wages are paid.
5.2 Effect of increased capital income tax rate
It can be shown that the income qJff effect is positive the individual has decreas-
ing absolute risk aversion, and if cov[V'(C2,1),;Y]' E[v"(C2,1)] > cov[V"(C2,1),;Y]'
E [V'(C2,1)].
Now the effect of the level of real capital investments in the widely held corpo-
ration can be expressed as the sum of an income and a substitution effect:
(20)
{
{J·F{Kll+r.B! _ r . E[V'{C2,ll] } BK
_ l+{l-tk)·r u"{CI,ll . _I
+f3 . K . [1+ (1 - t ) . r] . E[v"{C2,ll'::Y] BY
I k ,."{CI,ll
f32 . [1 - tk] . Kl { "(C) [ ( )]2 ["( )]}+ F. E [V'(C2,1)] . u 1,1 + 1+ 1- tk . r . E v C2,1
{
E [V"(C2,1) .;y. ;y]. E [V'(C2,1)] }
. -E [V'(C2,1) .;yJ . E [V"(C2,1) .;y] .
The widely held corporation has no income shifting incentives by an increased
tax rate on capital income. The increased tax reduces returns to all types of invest-
ments at the same rate, and reduces his total income. It is thus likely that the above
expression is negative. Nevertheless, the increased tax on capital income induces
the individual to increase investments in firm specific real capital if V"'(C2,1) > O,
cov [V"(C2,1) . ;Y,;yJ . E [V'(C2,1)] < cov [V'(C2,1),;Y] . E [V"(C2,1) .;yJ , and if the substi-
tution effect dominates the total income effect.
In the absence of risk, the optimal investment condition reduces to the Fisher
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condition, and tax changes have no effect on the investment decision in the widely
held corporation.
5.3 The indirect utility function.
The indirect utility function of the individual when his firm is organized as a widely
held corporation is given by
(21)
where
(22)
(23)
This will be used in the analysis of which organizational form to choose.
6 When to incorporate?
The only reason for the sole proprietor to incorporate is assumed to be to reduce
tax payments. Under the split model, a part of the firm's income is taxed as labor
income, whereas all firm income is taxed as capital income under the corporate tax
schedule. But in order to be taxed as a widely held corporation, at least (3 of profits
must be paid as dividends to passive shareholders. Only if the sole proprietor has
positive imputed personal income has he incentives to incorporate. Thus assume
that the expected imputed personal income of the sole proprietor is positive after he
has exhausted the income shifting possibilities inherent in the split model through
real capital investments, such that he expects to have a positive imputed return to
labor.
For simplicity, let the costs19 of incorporating be zero. The sole proprietor incor-
19This is a simplifying assumption. Still, the actual costs of organizing as a corporation are
moderate, and the process is also not that complicated. But corporations are subject to stricter
regulations than sole proprietors. For instance, they are obliged to have an accountant.
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porates if he achieves the higher maximum achievable expected utility as a widely
held corporation:
Incorporate if Eul - Eus> 0,
where Eul is defined by the equations (21)-(23) and Eul is definedby the equations
(12)-(14). The larger this difference,the higher the incentives to incorporate in order.
to reduce total tax payments.
By applying the envelope theorem, let us now study how policy changes affect
the incentives to incorporate.
The labor income tax rate. The effect on the incentives to incorporate by an
increase in the labor income tax rate is given by:
(24)
{F(Ks) - (r + 1-£ + 8+ Xs) . Ks} . E [v( 82,s)] .
i
J
~',
t
It is already assumed that the sole proprietor must expect to have a positive im-
puted return to labor in order to even consider incorporating. From the definition
of the risk compensating factor, condition (3), it followsthat (24) is positive if the
expected imputed return to labor income at least covers the premium in optimum,
Xs. The higher the expected imputed return to labor income, the larger are the in-
centives to incorporate. The factor working against this is the fact that the net risk
compensation rate under the split model actually increases when the labor income
tax rate increases.
The capital income tax rate. The effect of an increase in the capital income
tax rate on the incentives to incorporate is given by
(25)
- {ø· [F(KI) - 8 - Xl] + r- Bl} . E [v'(82,1)]
+ {(r + 1-£) • ic,+ r· Bs} . E [v'(82,s)] ,
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which most likely is negative. The reason for this is twofold. First, the overall incen-
tives for participating in tax minimizing incomeshifting decreasewhen the difference
between the marginal tax rates on labor and capital decrease. Second, all income
of the entrepreneur is affected by the tax increase when he is organized as a widely
held corporation, while only part of the sole proprietor's income is affected by the
tax increase.
(26)
~
1
j
1~
The risk compensation factor. An increase in the risk compensation factor
under the split model reduces the incentives for the sole proprietor to incorporate,
as is seen from the below expression:
The higher the risk compensation factor, the more of the sole proprietor's income is
taxed as capital income, and the less attractive is it to incorporate in order to avoid
the split model.
Shares held by the active owner. ABlong as the expected after tax net busi-
ness income of the widely held corporation is positive, an increase in the maximum
allowedownership share of the active owner increases the incentives to incorporate:
(27)
The effect is greater the lower the tax rate on capital income and the higher the net
business income.
7 Empirical observations.
High-incomesole proprietors are subject to the top marginal tax rate on the imputed
return to labor, and these are expected to take advantage of the income shifting
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possibilities through increasing their real capital stock. And in fact the Norwegian
sole proprietors in the top decile of the income distribution more than doubled the
value of their real capital from 1992to 200020, as figure 1 shows.These are aggregate
data, and it is not possible to see whether there has been a shift in the type of real
capital investments. Unfortunately, there are no available data prior to the 1992-tax
reform. Still, it ought to take the firm some time to adjust its investment decision
to the new tax rules. As new sole proprietors reach the top marginal tax bracket
on labor income, they adapt to the tax minimizing incentives inherent in the split
model. Hence one would expect a development towards more real capital in this
group over time, rather than a shift to a new investment level directly after the tax
reform.
The number of sole proprietors decreased during the 1990's,while the total num-
ber of corporations increased by more than the same amount, as is seen in figure
221. Even if part of the decline of sole proprietors is due to a reduction of the pri-
mary sector, mostly farming, there was also a reduction in other sectors. At the
same time there was a reduction in the number of closely held corporations, as well
as an increase in widely held corporations. A strong selection also took place. The
closely held corporations mostly have negative imputed return to labor, and their
active owners hence do not pay labor income taxes. In 1992,65%of the closelyheld
corporations had negative imputed return to labor, while this share had increased
to 80% in 2000. Also, in 1995, 28% of all one-man corporations were closely held,
and already two years later this share had fallen to 20%.
This can be interpreted as an indication of a tax induced shift in organizational
form and choice of tax regime. Sole proprietors incorporate in order to escape the
split model, and corporations choose to be widely held in order to escape the split
model. Only corporations with low profits and thus also low or negative imputed
return to labor stay under the split model.
20Calculations made on combined survey and register data from Statistics Norway. Annual sam-
ple of ca. 4000, but weighted for representability. The primary sector is heavily regulated and
subsidized, and self-employed in this sector are excluded from the sample.
21Source: Statistics Norway.
Data are unfortunatelly not available for the whole time period in question.
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Figure 1: The value of the sole proprietors' real capital in thousands, 199B-prices.
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Figure 2: Number of sole proprietors and corporations over time.
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8 Conclusions.
The above analysis concludes that the split model counteracts the negative.effects
of the risk of a technology shock on the sole proprietor's investments in firm specific
real capital, and it encourages more real capital investments than in the absence
of taxes. The split model might actually induce the sole proprietor to over-invest
in less risky real capital. Real capital investments are a device for shifting income
from the labor income tax base to the capital income tax base in order to reduce the
sole proprietor's total tax payments. The incentives to participate in tax minimizing
income shifting increase as his income increases. The net risk compensation rate
under the split model is higher the higher the labor income tax rate, and thus the
incentives to over-invest in firm specificreal capital may increase as the labor income
tax rate increases.
In addition, the widely held corporation serves as a tax shelter for high income
sole proprietors. The higher his income, and the larger the difference between the
tax rates on labor income and capital income, the larger the incentives to become
a widely held corporation in order to escape the split model and reduce total tax
payments. Only low-incomeentrepreneurs have incentives to stay under the split
model in order to deduct the negative imputed labor income against future positive
imputed return to labor.
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10 Mathematical appendix
Properties of the utility function: We know that CWy) < O,v'(C2) > Oand
v"(C2) < O. It then follows that
COV[V'(C2),C2] < O and cov[v'(C2),;Y] > O,
cOV[V"(C2),C2] { > O ifv"'(C2) > O and cov[v"(C2),7] { < O ifv
lll
(C2) > O
< O ifvlll(C2) < O > O ifvlll(C2) < O
The individual has increasing absolute risk aversion if v"'(C2) < O.
The individual has decreasing absolute risk aversion if VIII (C2) > O and if
v"'(G ) > v"(C2)2
2 V'(C2) .
Developing equation (3):
E [v' (C2) • ;y]
E[v' (C2)]
E [v' (C2)]· E [7]+ cov [v' (C2) ,7]
E[v' (C2)]
0+ cov [v' (C2), ;y]
E [v' (C2)]
e
{l+ (1- tk)· r}. E[v'(C2,s)] E [V'(C2 I: { [1- tw]· [FKB -7] }]
,s + [tw - tk] . [r + fL] + 1
1
Developing equation (9): We know from (7) that u'(CI,s) = {I + (1- tk) . r}·
E [v'(C2,.)]. Apply this to equation (8) and rearrange:
E [v'(C2,.)]
[1 - t l F _ [1 - tw]· E [v'(C2,.) .7]
w KB E [v'(C2,.)]
+ [tw - tk] . [r + fL] + 1
1
1- tw
E [v'(C2,s) .7] tw - tk
r + E [v'(C2,.)] - 1- tw • fL
.JJ. Apply equation (3)
t - tkr+o+A __ w__ .1I.
• I-tw""
(28)
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10.1 Conditions for the existence of a local maximum for
the sole proprietor:
1) EUBB < O
2) EUKK < O
3) EUBB· EUKK - (EUBK)2 > O
From equation (7) it follows that
EUBB = u"(C1,s) + {I + (1- tk)· r}2. E [v"(C2,s)] < O.
From equation (8) it follows that
u"(C1,s) + [1- tw]· FK•K •• E [v'(C2,s)] + A2 • E [v"(C2,s)]
-2· A· [1- tw]· E [v"(C2,s) .::y] + [1- tw]2 . E [v"(C2,s) .::Y.::y)
< O
where
A (29)
A
.tJ. use condition (28)
E [v'(C2,s) .::y)
[1+ [1- tk]· r] + [1- tw]· E [v'(C2,s)] (30)
Also, from equation (7) it follows that
EUBK = u"(C1,s) + [1+ (1 - tk) . r]· {A· E [v"(C2,s)]- [1- tw]· E [v"(C2,s) .::y)}
Define
D _ EUBB· EUKK - (EUBK)2 > O
.tJ.
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D {u"(Cl,s)+{1+(1-tk)·r}2.E[v"(C2,s)]} (31)
{
U"(Cl,s) + [1- tw]' FKsKs . E [v'(C2,s)] + A2 . E [v"(C2,s)] }
. -2· A· [1- tw]' E [v"(C2,s) .::y] + [1- tw]2 . E [v"(C2,s) .::y.::y]
_ {U"(Cl,S) + [1+ (1 _ tk) . -l { A· E [V"(~2,S)] _}}2
- [1- tw]' E [v (C2,s) . 'Y]
> O
10.2 The income effect of the sole proprietor.
From the first order condition (8) it follows that
u"(Cl,s)' [~~s +~i-1] + [1- tw]' FKsKs' E[v'(C2,s)]
[ {
[l - tw] • (FKs - ::y) . ~ }]
+A·E v"(C2,s)' +(l+[tw-tk]·[r+J.l])'~
+ [1+ (1 - tk) . r] . ~
[ {
[l - tw]' (FKs -::y) . ~ }]
- [1- tw]' E v"(C2,s)'::Y' + (1+ [tw - tk]' [r + J.l]). ~
+ [1+ (1 - tk) . r] . ~
O
~ (32)
etc, { u"(Cl,s) + [1 - tw]' FKsKs . E [v'(C2,s)] + A2. E [v"(C2,s)] }
ay' -2· A· [1- tw]' E [v"(C2,s) .::y] + [1- tw]2 . E [v"(C2,s) .::y.::y]
+aBs. {U"(Cl,S) + [1+ (1- tk) . r]' { A· E [V"(~2,s)] }}
ay - [1 - tw] . E [v (C2,s) .::y]
u"(C )l,s
And from the first order condition (7) it follows that
"(C ). [aKs aBs _ 1]u l,s ay + ay
[ {
[l - tw] • (FKs - ::y) . ~ }]
+ [1+ (1- tk) . r]. E v"(C2,s)· + (1+ [tw - tk]' [r + J.l]) . ~
+ [1+ (1 - tk) . r]· ~
O
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~ ~
o«, { "(C ) + [1+ (1 t) ] { A· E [v"(C2,s)] }}
ay' u l,s - k • r· _ [1 _ tw]. E [v"(C2,s) .;:y]
+~~ . {u"(Cl,s) + [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2 . E [v"(C2,s)l}
u"(C )l,s
By Cramer's rule, equations (32) and (33) yield:
!
U"(Cl,s) + [1+ (1 - tk) . r] )
u"(Cl,s) {A. E [v"(C2,s)] }
D - [1 - tw]' E [v"(C2,s)· 7]
- {u"(Cl,s) + [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2. E [v"(C2,s)l}
~ apply definition (30)
u"(C )l,s
D
u"(Cl,s) + [1+ (1- tk) . T]
{
[I + (1 - tk) . r]· E [v"(C2,s)] }
. + [1 - t ] . E[V'(C2,s)-'r) • E [v"(C )]
w E[V'(C2,s») 2,s
- [1 - tw]' E [v"(C2,s) . 7]
-u"(Cl,s) - [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2 . E [v"(C2,s)]
(34)
u"(Cl,s) . [1+ (1- tk) . r]. [1- tw] • { E [V"(C2,8) . ;:y]. E [V'(C2,8)) }
D· E [v'(C2 s))
, -E [V'(C2,8) .7]. E [v"(C2,s))
AB U"(Cl s)·[t+(l-tk)·r)·[l-tw) < O the sign of the income effect is determined by the
D.E[v'(C2,s)] ,
expressions in the parenthesis. Thus
~~s > O if E [v"(C2,s) . ;:y). E [v'(C2,s))- E [v'(C2,s)· ;:y). E [v"(C2,s)) < O
We know that
E [v" (C2,s) . ;:y). E [v'(C2,s))
{cov [v"(C2,s),;:Y) + E [v"(C2,s))· E [7]}. E [v'(C2,s))
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and
E [V'(C2,s) .;:yJ . E [VI/(C2,s)]
{CO'll [v'(C2,skY] + E [V'(C2,s)]· E Fy]}· E [vl/(C2,s)]
This means that
~~s > O if cov [vl/(C2,skr]· E [v'(C2,s)]- cov [v'(C2,s),;:Y]· E [vl/(C2,s)] < o.
We already know that
E [v'(C2,s)] > O, cov [v'(C2,s),;:Y] > O and E [vl/(C2,s)] < o.
First, consider the case where vl11(C2,s) > o.
vl11(C2,s) > O==} COV [vl/(C2,s),;:yJ < o.
.lJ.
~~s > O if COV [vl/(C2,s), ;:Yl· E [v'(C2,s)l < CO'll [v'(C2,s), ;:Yl· E [vl/(C2,s)],
which are both negative. This means that in order for the above condition to be
met, the absolute value of the left hand side must be larger than the absolute value
of the right hand side.
Next, consider the case where vl11(C2,s) < o.
vl11(C2,s) < O==} CO'll [vl/(C2,s),;:yJ > o.
.lJ.
BKs
BY < o.
10.2.1 The effect on the investment portfolio and risk profile of the sole
proprietor by changed tax on labor income.
Differentiate equation (7) with respect to t; to find that:
-ul/(C1,s) . {-K'(tw) - B'(twH
+ {l + (1 - tk) . r} . E ['111/( C2,s) . BZ:s]
O
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~ ~
K'(tw) . {U"(Cl,.) + [1+ (1 - tk) . rl- [ A· E [V"(~2,.)) _] }
- [1 - tw)' E [v (C2,.) • 'Y)
+B'(tw) . {u"(Cl,.) + [1+ (1 - tk) . r)2. E [v"(C2,.)l)
[ ( )) {
[F(K.) - (r + Il) . K.)· E [v"(C2,.)) }1+ 1- tk . r .
-K.· E [v"(C2,.)·;;Y)
For simplicity, name the different parts of the above equation as
Next, condition (8) is differentiated:
U"(Cl,.) . {K'(tw) + B'(twH
+ {-FK, + [1- tw)' FK,K •. K'(tw) + r + Il}' E [v'(C2,.))
+A. E [V"(O ). 8C2,.]2,. 8t
w
+E [V'(C2,.) .;;y)
- [1- tw)' E [V"(C2,.) .;y. 8Z:·]
O
(36)
{
U"(Cl,s) + [1- tw)' FK•K •. E [V'(C2,8)) }
K'(tw) . +A2. E [v"(C2,.))- 2· [1- tw)' A· E [v"(C2,.) .;;y)
+ [1 - tw)2 . E [v"(C2,.) .;y.;y)
+B'(tw) • {U"(Cl,8) + [1+ (1- tk) . rl- { A· E [V"(~2,.)) }}
- [1 - tw) • E [v (C2,.) • ;;y)
A· [F(Ks) - (r + Il) . Ks)· E [v"(C2,.))
+ [FK, - (r + Il))' E [v'(C2,.))
-A· K.· E [v"(C2,.) . ;y)- E [v'(C2,s) .;y)
- [1 - tw)' [F(Ks) - (r + Il) . Ks)· E [v"(C2,s) .;;y)
+ [1- tw)' tc.. E [v"(C2,s) .;y.;y)
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Name the parts of the above equation
By Cramer's rule equations (35) and (36) yield:
(37)
where
be : aKB
{
U"(CI s) + [ [1+ (1- tk) . r]' {A - [1- tw]' E~[:,~f~;:~i7)}l}
, ·E [v"(C2,s)]
{
[F(Ks) - (r + f.1.) • Ks] } "
. [1+ (1 - tk) . r]· -K . E[V"(C2,.l''Y] • E [v (C2,s)]
s E[V"(C2,.l)
Apply the definition (30) of A:
be : aKB
{
U"(Cl,s) + [1+ [1 - tk]' r]· E [V"(C2,s)] }
+[l+(l-tkl.r).[l-t",J . { E [v'(C2,s)' 7]' E [v"(C2,s)] }
E[V'(C2 •• l) -E [V"(C2,s) .7]. E [v'(C2,s)]
{
[F(Ks) - (r + f.1.) • Ks] } "
. [1+ (1 - tk) . r]· _. E[V"(C2,.lj) • E [v (C2,s)]
te, E[V"(C2,.l)
We know from the income effect (34) that
_ åKs . D = [1+ (1- tk) . r]· [1- tw] • { -E [v"(C2,s) . 7]. E [v'(C2,s)] }
åY U"(C1,s) E [v'(C2,s)] +E [v'(C2,s) . 7]' E [v"(C2,s)]
~ (38)
{
U"(Cl,s) 2}be : aKB E [v"(C
2
,s)] + [1+ (1- tk) . r] . [1+ (1- tk) . r]
[ ( ) (
E[V"(C2,s) '7]) ] [ "( ]2. F K; - r + f.1. + E [v"(C2,s)] . K; .E v C2,s)
_ D· E [v"(C2,s)] . åKs . [1 (1- t ). ]
u"(C1,s) åY + k r
[ (
E[V"(C2,S)'7])]
. F(Ks) - r + f.1. + E [V"(C2,s)] . Ks
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Next,
\
A· [F(Ks) - (r + /1) . Ks]' E [vl/(C2,s)]
+ [FK• - (r + /1)]' E [v'(C2,s)]
- A . K . E[V"(C2,.)·'Y] . E [vl/(G )]s E[V"(C2,.)] 2,s
- E[V'(C2 ••H] . E [v'(G )]
E[V'(C2,.)] 2,s
-e- [1 - tw]' [F(Ks) - (r + /1) . Ks]
• E[V"(C2,.)·'Y] • E [v"(G )]
E[V"(C2,.)] 2,s
+ [1- tw]' Ks' E[VI/(C2,.)·'7·7]
. {ul/(CI,.) + [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2 . E [vl/(C2,s)l}
From (28) we know that
F -r- _ E[v'(C2,.)·'7]_ l-tk
K. /1- E[v'(C2,.)] l-tw/1
.u.. Also use definition (30) of A:
[1+ [1 - tk]' r]' [F(Ks) - (r + /1) . K.]. E [vl/(C2,.)]
+ [1- tw]' E1Vt'\f~2.~ij]. [F(K.) - (r + /1) . K.]· E [vl/(C2,s)]
+ E[V'(C2,.)·'Y] _ l-to Il] . E[v'(G )]
E[V'(C2,.)] l-tw"'" 2,.
[1+ [1 t] ] K E[V"(C2,.)·'Y] E [1/(0 )]- - k • r· s ' E[VII(C2,.)]· V 2,.
- [1 - t ]. E[V'(C2,.)·'Y] • K . E[V"(C2,.)·'Y] • E [vl/(G )]
w E[V'(C2,.)] s E[V"(C2,.)] 2,.
- E[V'(C2,.H] . E [v'(O )]
E[V'(C2,.)] 2,s
- [1 - tw]' [F(K.) - (r + /1) . K.]
• E[V"(C2 .)''Y] • E [v"(O )]
E[V"(C2,.)] 2,s
+ [1 - tw] •K; . E [vI/(C2,.) . '7 . '7]
. {u"(C1,s) + [1+ (1- tk) . r]2. E [vl/(C2,.)]}
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bk· aBB
[F(K ) - (r + J.L). K J. [l-tw] • [ E [v' (C2,.) .1] . E [v"(C2,.)J l
• • E[V'(C2,.)] -E [v"(C2,.) • 1] . E [v'(C2,.)J
[F(K.) - (r + J.L). K.J . E [v"(C2,.)J . [1+ [1 - tkJ . rJ
- i=::J.L· E [v'(C2,.)J
-E [v"(C2,.) .;:yJ . K s ' {[l + [1- tkJ . rJ + [1- twJ . EJ[~~f~;~~ij]}
+ [1- twJ . K.· E [v"(C2,.) .;:y. 1]
. {ul/(C1,.) + [1+ (1 - tk) . rJ2 . E [vl/(C2,.)l}
We know from the income effect (34) that
BK. D
- BY . [1+ (1 - tk) . rJ . ul/(C1,.)
[1- twJ {-E [vl/(C2,.) .1] . E [v'(C2,.)J }
E [v'(C2,.)J· +E [v'(C2,.) .1] . E [vl/(C2,.)J
{ul/(C1,.) + [1+ (1 - tk) . rJ2 . E [vl/(C2,.)]}
- U"(Cl,.).[P+(I-tk).r] . ~ • [F(K.) - (8+ r + J.L). K.J
+ [1+ (1 - tk) . rJ . [F(K.) - (r + J.L+ EJ[:,~f~;~~ij]).K.]
. E [vl/(C2,.)J
-i=i: ·J.L·E[v'(C2,.)J
{
E [vl/(C ) - ;::;1 }+ 1 t K 2,. . 'Y . 'Yl[ - wJ· s " _ E [vl/(C ).::;;l. E[V'(C2,.)·'Y]
2,. Tl E[V'(C2,.)]
This yields
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(39)
1
-D· (bB· aKB - bk· aBB)
u"(C1,s) + [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2 . E [v"(C2,s)]
u"(C1,s) . [1+ (1 - tk) . r]
·~i.[F(Ks) - (r + /-L) . Ks]
+u"(C1,s) + [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2 . E [v"(C2,s)]
D
[1+ (1- tk) . r]· E [v"(C2,.)]
. [F(K.) - ( +E~/~C:,).'Y] ) . Ks]
Elv"(C2,.)]
- i=;! . /-L . E [v'( C2,s)]
+ [1 - tw]· tc.. {E [v"(C2,s) .;:y. 1] - E~[:~f~;~~)I]. E [v"(C2,s) . 1]}
- ~ . {u"(C1,s) + [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2 . E [v" (C2,s)]} . E [v"(C2,s)]
·[1+ (1- tk) . r]· [F(Ks) - (r + /-L+ Elv~~~~~~s)~]) . Ks]
+E [v"(C2,s)] . åKs . [1+ (1 _ t ) . r]
u"(C1,s) åY k
[ (
E[V"(C2,S).1])]
· F(Ks) - r + /-L+ E [v"(C2,.)] • K;
This yields condition (10):
{
F(K.)-(r+p).K. } o«
K'(tw) = - Il+(l-tk)·r] EI"(C ) _] • _.+ [1+ (1 - tk) . r]· v 2, •• "1 • K åY
U"(Cl,.) •
+u"(C1,.) + [1+ (1- tk) . r]2. E [v"(C2,.)]
[1 - tw]· D· E [v'(C2,.)]
{
[1- t ]2. K . { E [v"(C2,.) .;:y. ;:y]. E [v'(C2,s)] }}
. w. -E [v'(C2,s) . ;:y]. E [v"(C2,s) .;:y]
- [1 - tk]·/-L· E [v'(C2,s)]2
.As F(Ks) - (r + /-L) . K, > Oand EI:;,~g~,:~.'Y]> O,then the sign of the first line
(which is the total income effect) depends on the sign of ~, which again depends
on the sign of v'" (C2,.), as previously discussed.
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Also UI(Cl,.)+[1+(1-tk)·rfE[v"(C2,.)] < o such that the substitution effect of the tax
, [1-tw]·D.E[v'(C2,.)] ,
change depends on whether the last parenthesis is positive or negative.
The substitution effect is positive if
{
E [V"(C2,s) .;:y.;yJ . E [V'(C2,s)] } < [1 - tk]' IL· E [V'(C2,s)]2
-E [V'(C2,s) .;yJ . E [V"(C2,s) .;:y] [1 - tw]2. te,
We know that
E [v"(C2,s) .;:y.;yJ . E [v'(C2,s)]- E [v'(C2,s) .;yJ . E [v"(C2,s) .;yJ
cov [v" (C2,s) . ;:Y,;yJ . E [v' (C2,s)] - cov [v'(C2,s),;yJ . E [v"(C2,s) . ;yJ
This means that the substitution effect is positive if
cov [v"(C2,s) .;:Y, ;:y]. E [v'(C2,s)] < cov [v'(C2,s),;yJ . E [v"(C2,s) . ;yJ < O.
Thus, a necessary condition for the substitution effect being positive, is that
cov [v"(C2,s) . ;:Y,;:y) < O. This means that v"'(C2,s) > o. Since O < ;:y < 1, we will
still have that D..;:Y > O===}D.. (v"(C2,s) .;:y) < O.
The substitution effect is negative if v"'(C2,s) < o.
To summarize:
v"'(G ) > O2,s
The substitution effect
Positive if cov [v"(C2,s)' ;:Y,;:y) . E [v'(C2,s)] < cov [v'(C2,s),;:Y]· E [v"(C2,s)';yJ
and
negative if cov [v"(C2,s)' ;:Y,;yJ . E [v'(C2,s)] > cov [v'(C2,s),;:Y]· E [v"(C2,s)';yJ
and
The total income effect
Positive if cov [v"(C2,s),;yJ . E [v'(C2,s)] > cov [v'(C2,s), ;:y]. E [v"(C2,s)]
and
negative if cov [v"(C2,s),;yJ . E [v'(C2,s)] < cov [v'(C2,s), ;:y]. E [v"(C2,s)]
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As O<;Y < 1, we know that E [v"(C2,.) .;.y) > E [v"(C2,.)J, since E [v"(C2,.)J < o.
This means that
cov [v'(C2,.),;.y) . E [v"(C2,.)J < cov [v'(C2,.),;.y) . E [v"(C2,.) .;.y) (40)
Following the same line of reasoning yields that
cov[v"(C2,.),;.y) ·E[v'(C2,.)J < cov[v"(C2,.) .;Y,;.y) ·E[v'(C2,.)J. (41)
K'(tw) > O certainly holds if both the substitution effect and the total income
effect are positive, that is if
cov [v"(C2,.) .;Y,;YJ . E [v'(C2,.)J < cov [v'(C2,.),;.y) . E [v"(C2,.) .;yJ
and
cov [v"(C2,.),;YJ . E [v'(C2,.)J > cov [v'(C2,.),;.y) . E [v"(C2,.))
But following (40) and (41) this cannot be true. For the same reason, the total
income effect and the substitution effects cannot both be negative.
Thus, we have established that the total income effect and the substitution effects
have opposite sign.
K'(tw) > O if
1) V"'(C2,.) > O
and
2) cov [v"(C2,.) .;y, ;y). E [v'(C2,.)) < cov [v'(C2,.),;.y) . E [v"(C2,.) .;y)
and
3) The substitution effect dominates the total income effect.
Next:
v"'(O ) < O2,.
e«,ay < O, and the total income effect is positive.
and
The substitution effect is negative.
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This means that
K'(tw) > O if
1) vll/(C2,s) < O
and
2) : The total income effect dominates the substitution effect.
10.2.2 The effect on the investment portfolio and risk profile of the sole
proprietor by changed tax on capital income.
Differentiating the first order condition (7) yields
-u"(C1,s) . {-K'(tk) - B'(tkH - r· E [v'(C2,.)]
+{l+ (1- tk)· r}. E [V"(C2,S). a~:s]
O
~ ~
K'(tk) . {U"(Cl,S) + [1+ (1- tk) . -l [ A· E [V"(~2,S)] _] }
- [1 - tw]· E [v (C2,s) .,,]
+B'(tk) . {u"(C1,s) + [1+ (1- tk) . r]2. E [V"(C2,B)]}
r » E [v'(C2,s)] + [1+ (1- tk) . r]· {lr+ Il]· K, + r· BB} . E [V"(C2,B)]
Write this as
Next, condition (8) is differentiated:
-u"(C1,B) . {-K'(tk) - B'(tkH
+~~ .E [v'(C2,s)] + A· E [V"(C2,B). a~:B]
[ ] [
"( ) _ aC2 B]- 1- tw • E V C2,B .". at:
O
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(43)
{
U"(Cl,s) + [1- tw]' FK•K .: E [v'(C2,s)] }
K'(tk) . +A2. E [v"(C2,s)]- 2·A· [1- tw]' E [v"(C2,s) .;y]
+ [l - tw]2. E [v"(C2,s) .;y.;yJ
{
U"(Cl,s) + [1+ (1 - tk) . r] }
B'(tk) . A· E [v"(C2,s)]
. { - [1 - tw]' E [v"(C2,s) .;y] }
{
(r + J.L) . E [v'(C2,s)] + A· ([r + J.L]' te, + r· Bs) . E [v"(C2,s)] }
- [1 - tw]' ([r + J.L]' K, + r- Bs) . E [v"(C2,s) .;yJ
Write this as
By applying Cramer's rule and using the definition of A, equations (42) and (43)
yield:
where
{
r·E[v'(C2,s)] }
+ [1+ (1- tk) . r]· {lr + J.L]' K, + r » Bs}' E [V"(C2,s)]
{
U"(Cl,s) + [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2 . E [v"(C2,s)] }
. +[1+(l-tkl.r].[l-tw] • { E [v'(C2,s) .;yJ. E [v"(C2,s)] }
E[V'(C2,.l] -E [v"(C2,s) .;yJ . E [v'(C2,s)]
We know from the income effect (34) that
BKs D
- BY . u"(C1,s)
[1+ (1 - tk) . r] . [1 - tw]
E [v'(C2,s)]
. { -E [v"(C2,s) . ;y]. E [v'(C2,s)] }
+E [v'(C2,s) .;yJ . E [v"(C2,s)]
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{
r- Efv'(C2,s)] }
+ [l + (l - tk) . r]' {lr + It)· K; + r· Bs} . E [v"(C2,s))
. { u"(C1,s) + [l ~~~ tk) ~r)2. E [v"(C2,s)) }
ay u"(C1,.)
Now, we have that
btc : XBB
lix : XBB
l
(r + It) . E [v'(C2,s)) )
[l + (l - tk) . r)
+ { + [1- t l E[V'(C2,.FiJ }. ([r + It]· «,+ r· Bs) . E [v"(C2,s)]
w E[V'(C2,.)J
- [1- tw)' ([r + It]· K; + r- Bs) . E [v"(C2,s) .;;y]
. {u"(C1,s) + [l + (l - tk) . r)2 . E [v"(C2,s)]}
{u"(C1,s) + [l + (l - tk) . r)2 . E [v"(C2,s)l}
l(r + It) . E [v'(C2,s)] ). + [l + (l - tk) . r) . ([r + It]· te, ;- r . Bs)~ E [V"~~2,S))+ [l _ t ) . [r+/L)·K.+r.B a , { E [v (C2,s) . 'Y) . E [v (C2,s)] }w E[V'(C2,.») -E [v"(C2,s) .;;y) . E [v'(C2,s)]
{u"(C1,s) + [l+ (l - tk) . r]2 . E [v"(C2,s)l}
{
(r + It) . E [v'(C2,s)) }
+ [l + (l - tk) . r]· ([r + It]· K, + r » Bs) . E [v"(C2,s)]
- {u"(C1,s) + [l+ (1- tk) . r)2 . E [v"(C2,s)]}
åKs D· {lr + It] . Ks + r . Bs}
. åY . [l+ (1- tk) . r]. u"(C1,s)
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Thus
hB' XKB - hK . xBB
-D
r· E [v'(C2,s)] + [1+ (1- tk) . r]. { [r ::]~~s } . E [v"(C2,s)]
D
· {u"(C1,s) + [1+ (1- tk)' r]2. E [v"(C2,s)]}
+ { r- E [v'(C2,s)] }
+ [1+ (1 - tk) . r]· nr + IL]' K, + r- Bs} . E [v"(C2,s)]
oie, D
· ay . u"(C1,s)
+u"(C1,s) + [1+ (1- tk) . r]2 . E [v"(C2,s)]
D
{
(r + IL) . E [v'(C2,s)] }
+ [1+ (1 - tk) . r]· ([r + IL]' K, + r· Bs) . E [v"(C2,s)]
- {u"(C1,s) + [1+ (1- tk) . r]2. E [v"(C2,s)]}
aKs [r + IL] . Ks + r . Bs
· ay . [1+ (1 - tk) . r]· u"(C1,s)
.ij.
u"(C1,s) + [1+ (l-~k)' r]2. E [v"(C2,s)] . {IL' E [v'(C2,s)]}
ss, 1+--.~~--~~~~
ay [1+ (1- tk) . r]· u"(C1,s)
- [r + IL]' Ks' u"(C1,s) - r· B, . u"(C1,s)
- [r + IL]' Ks' [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2 . E [v"(C2,s)]
-r· Bs' [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2 . E [v"(C2,s)]
+ [1+ (1- tk)' r]· r- E[v'(C2,s)]
+ [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2 . [r + IL]' Ks' E [v" (C2,s)]
+ [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2 . r- B, .E [v"(C2,s)]
(44)
aKs. {r. E [v'(C2,s)] _ [lr + IL]' Ks + r· Bs] }
ay u"(C1,s) 1+ (1- tk) . r
+ {u"(C1,s) + [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2 . E [v"(C2,s)]} . Il-' E [~(C2'S)]
< o
49
10.3 The widely held corporation
The individual's maximization problem when organizing as a widely held organiza-
tion is given by
where C1,1 and C2,1 are given byequations (15):
Cl,1 = y - (3 . Kl - Bl
and (16):
C2,1 = (3 . [1 - tk] . [F(KI) - ;y . Kl] + (3 . Kl + [1+ (1 - tk) . r]· Bl.
The resulting first order conditions are given by equation (17):
and (18):
FOCKI : -(3. U/CC1,1) +E [v/CC2,!). {(3. [1- tk]· [FKI -;:yJ +~}] = O
Combining the first order conditions yields the optimal investment condition
(19):
Define
G _ [1 - tk] . FKl + 1
by (19)
E[v'(C2)· ;:yJ
[1+ (1 - tk) • r] + E [v/(C
2
)]G
The conditions for the existence of a maximum of the widely held corpo-
ration:
EUBB = UI/(C1,1) + [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2 . E [Vl/CC2,1)] < O,
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Thus
(45)
10.4 The income effect in the widely held corporation.
Differentiate (17) with respect to initial income Y :
-U"(Cl,l) .{l- /3. Kf(Y) - Bf(Y)}
{
/3. G· E [V"(C2,1)]· KI(Y) }
+ [1+ (1- tk) . r]· -/3. [1- tk]· E [V"(C2,1) .::y] . Kf(Y)
+ [1+ (1 - tk) . r]· E [V"(C2,1)]· Bf(Y)
= O
'() {"( ) [ ( )] { G·E[V"(C2l)] }}Kl Y . /3. U Cl,l + 1+ 1- tk . r . " , _
- [1- tk]· E [v (C2,l) . 'Y]
+Bf(Y) . {U"(Cl,l) + [1+ (1- tk) . r]2 . E [V"(C2,1)l}
u"(C )1,1
Define this as
K;(Y) . OBK + Bf(Y) . 0BB = åB
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Next, equation (18) is differentiated:
-/3. U//(C1,1) . {I- /3. Kf(Y) - B{(Y)}
+/3, [1- tk)' FK1K1 . E [V'(C2,1))' Kt(Y)
{
/3·G·E[V//(C2,1))·KHY)- }
+/3, G· /3. [1- tk)' E [V//(C2,1) . ;;y). K{(Y)
+ [1+ (1- tk) . r)· E [v//(C2,d)' BHY)
{
/3. G· E [V'(C2,1) . ;;y). K{(Y) }
-/3. [1- tk)' -/3. [1- tk)' E [v//(C2,d ~;;y. 7J . KHY)
+ [1+ (1 - tk) . r)· E [V//(C2,1) .7J . B;(Y)
O
!
/3. U//(C1,1)+ /3. [1- tk).//FKIKI . E [V'(C2,1)) l
K'(Y) . /3. +/3, Q2 . E [v (C2,1))
1 -2. /3. G· [1- tk)' E [V//(C2,1) .;;y)
+/3, [1- tk)2. E[v"(C2,1)';;Y';;Y)
') {//( ) [ ( )) { G·E[v//(C2d) }}+B1(Y·/3· u C1,1 + 1+ I-tk ·r· //'_
- [1 - tk)' E [v (C2,1) . T)
/3. U//(C1,1)
Define this as
Kf(Y) . OKK + B{(Y) . OKB = åK
By Cramer's rule,
K{(Y) = åB· OKB - åK • OBB åK • 0BB - åB • OKB
OBK . OKB - 0KK • OBB F
Kf(Y)
!
{U"(C1,1) + [1+ (1 - tk) . -r E [V//(C2,1)J} l
/3. U"(C1,1). -U//(C1,1)
F [() ) { G.E[v//(C2,1)) }- 1+ 1- tk . r .
- [1 - tk)' E [V//(C2,1) .;;y)
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K{(Y)
.lJ.. by the definition of G
/3. U"(C1,z)
F
[1+ (1- tk) . r]z. E [V"(C2,l)]
- [1+ (1 - tk) . r]
{
[I + (1- tk~ . r]._E [V"(C2,1)] }
. + (1- tk) • ~vv~~~:,~;'Y.E [V"(C2,l)]
- [1- tk] . E [V"(CZ,l) .;;y]
.lJ.. (46)
åKl -/3. U"(C1,l) . [1+ (1- tk) . r] . [1- tk]
åY F· E [V'(CZ,l)]
[
E[V'(C2,z)·;y)·E[V"(C2,l)] l
-E [V"(C2,l) .;y) . E [V'(C2,l)]
åKl > O if
åY
1) VI/I(C2,l) > O
and
2) : eau [V'(C2,l),;;Y] . E [V"(CZ,l)] > eov [V"(C2,l),;y) . E [V'(C2,l)].
10.4.1 The effect on real capital investments from increased tax on cap-
ital income.
Differentiate (17) with respect to tk :
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'() {"( ) [ ( )] { +G·E[V"(C21)] }}Kl tk . (3. U Cl,l + 1+ 1- tk . r . " ,
- [1 - tk]· E [v (C2,1) .;:yJ
+B{(tk) . {U"(Cl,l) + [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2. E [V"(C'2,1)l}
r » E [V'(C2,1)]
+ [1+ (1 - tk) . r]· E [V"(C2,1)]· [(3.F(Kl) + r· Bl]'
-{3. Kl . [1+ (1 - tk) . r]· E [V"(C2,1) .;:yJ
Define this as
Next, condition(17) is differentiated:
-(3. U"(Cl,l) . {-(3. Kf(tk) - B{(tk)}
-(3. FKl . E [V'(C2,1)]
+(3. [1 - tk]· FKlKl . E [V'(C2,1)]· K{(tk)
l
-(3. F(KI) . E [V"(C2,1)] + (3. Kl· E [V"(C2,1) .;:yJ l
G +(3. G· E [V"(C2,1)]· K{(tk)
+{3. . -(3. [1- tkj· E [V"(C2,1) • ::Yj. K{(tk) - r· Bl . E [V"(C2,I)j
+ [1+ (1- tk) . -l E [V"(C2,I)j· B{(tk)
+(3. E [V'(C2,1) .::Yj
-(3. F(Kl) . E [V"(C2,1) .;:yJ
+(3. Kl· E [V"(C2,1) .::y.;:yJ
+(3. G· E [V"(C2,1) .;:yJ . K{(tk)
-(3. [1- tk]· E [v"( C2,1) .::y .;:yJ . K{(tk)
-r· Bl· E [v"(C2,t)·::y]
+ [1+ (1 - tk) . rj· E [V"(C2,1) . ::y]. B{(tk)
= O
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{/3. U"(C1,1) + /3. G2 . E [V"(C2,1)] }
K{(tk) . /3. -2· /3. G· [1- tk]' E [V"(C2,1) .;y]
+/3, [1- tk]2 . E [V"(C2,1) .;y.;y] + [1- tk]' FKIKI . E [V'(C2,1)]
') {" [ ) ] { G·E[v"(C21)] }}+B1(tk ./3. u (C1,1)+ l+(l-tk ·r . ,,'_
- [1- tk]' E [v (C2,1) '''Y]
l
FKI• E [V'(C2,1)]- E [V'(C2,1) .1] - /3. G· Kl . E [V"(C2,1) . 1] )
{
G E[v"(G )] }+ FK + B . 2,1/3. {/3. (I) r- I}' -[1-tk].E[v"(C2,1).1]
+/3. [1- tk]' Kl' E [V"(C2,1) .;y. 1]
Define this as
By Cramer's rule:
Kf(tk) = jB . æKB - jK • æBB jK • æBB - jB • æKB
æBK'æKB-æKK'æBB F
r· E [V'(C2,1)]
-/3. [1+ [1- tk]' rI· Kl' E [V"(C2,1) . 1]
+ {/3. F(KI) + r » BI} . E [V"(C2,1)]' [1+ (1- tk) . r]
+E[:'(~~'l)l. {/3. F(KI) + r . BI}
{
E[V'(C2,1)·1]·E[v"(C2,1)] }
-E [V"(C2,1) . 1] . E [V'(C2,1)]
/3 1-tk .x, { E [V"(C2,1) .;y. ;y]. E [V'(C2,1)] }+ . .
E V'(C2,1) -E [V'(C2,1)' 1] . E [V"(C2,1) .;y]
. {U"(C1,1) + [1+ (1- tk) . r]2 . E [V"(C2,1)l}
{
r- E [V'(C2,1)} }
- + [1+ (1 - tk) . rI, E [V"(C2,1)]' {/3. F(KI) + r- BI}
-/3 . Kl . [1+ (1 - tk) . r] . E [V"(C2,1) .;y]
{
U"(C1,1) + [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2 . E [V"(C2,1)] }.!. + 1+ 1-tk .r .1-tk . { E [V'(C2,1) . ;y]. E [V"(C2,1)] }
E V'(C2,1) -E [V'(C2,1)]' E [V"(C2,1) .;y]
5:
-/3. [1+ [1- tk]' r]· Kl . E [V"(C2,1) .::y]
+ {/3. F(KI) + r . Bl} . E [V"(C2,/)] . [1+ (1 - tk) . r]
+/3, l-tk·KI .{ E[V"(C2,/)·;Y·::y]·E[v/(C2,!)] }
E V'(C2,1) -E [V/(C2,/) .::y] . E [V"(C2,/) .;y]
_ { [1+ (1- tk) . r]· E [V"(C2,/)]' {/3' F(KI) + r· BI} }
-/3. Kl' [1+ (1- tk) . r]· E [V"(C2,/)';Y]
. {U"(C1,/) + [1+ (1- tk) . r]2. E [V"(C2,/)l}
/3
F
{
{ ) } U"(Cl z) }/3. F(KI + r . BI . l+(l-tk)'T
+ -r· E [V/(C2,1)]
+/3. Kl' [1+ (1- tk) . r]· E [V"(C2,/) .::y]
. /3 . [1+ (1- tk) . r]· [1- tk] . { E [V/(C2,/) .7]. E [V"(C2,/)] }
F E [V/(C2,/)] -E [v/(C2,!)]' E [V"(C2,1) • 7]
Apply the definition of the income effect in equation (46):
{
{3·F(KI)+T·BI _ r . E[V'(C2,1)] } åK
1+(I-tk)'T U"(C11) I
- +/3 . K . [1+ (1 - t ) . r] . E[v"(C2,z)';Y] • åY
I k U"(C1,1)
/32 . [1 - tk] . Kl {"(C) [ ( )]2 ["(G)]}+ F. E [V/(C
2
,/)] • u 1,/ + 1+ 1- tk • r . E v 2,1
{
E [v"( C2,1) • ;y . ;y] . E [v'eC2,/)] }
-E [V/(C2,1) .7]. E [V"(C2,1) .;y]
AB the expression in the first parenthesis is positive, the sign of the total income
effect depends on the sign of !!Jff. We also know that :~~l;'~~~~l> O, and that
{U"(CI,/) + [1+ (1 - tk) . r]2 . E [V"(C2,/)]} < O.Thus the sign of the substitution
effect depends on the sign of the expression in the last parenthesis, which can be
rewritten as {cov [V"(C2,/) . ;Y,7]. E [v/(C2,!)]- COV [V/(C2,/),;Y]' E [V"(C2,1) • 7]}. The
signs of both the total income effect and the substitution effect depend on the
individual's risk aversion.
5E
K;(tk) > o if
1) VIl/(C2,1) > O
and
2) cov [V"( O2,1) . 1,::y] . E [V'( O2,1)] < cov [v' (02,1),::Y] . E [v" (02,1) . ::y]
and
3) : The substitution effect dominates the total income effect.
This means that
K'(tl) > O if
1) V"'(02,1) < O
and
2) The total income effect dominates the substitution effect.
10.5 When to incorporate?
where
c., y - k, - Bs
C2,s [1- tw]' [F(Ks) - l' Ks] + {l+ [tw - tk]' [r + JL]} . k,
+ [1+ (1 - tk) . r] . Bs•
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Effect of increase in the real interest rate
a (Eul- Eus)
ar
aE [V(C\I)] aE [V(C2,S)]
ar a,
(1- tk) . Bl . E [V'(C2,1)]
- {[tw - tk]' k,+ (1 - tk) . Bs} . E [v'(C2,s)]
Effect of increase in the amount of shares allowed held by the active
owner in the widely held corporation:
a (Eul- Eus)
aø
aU(C1,1) aE [V(C2,1)]
aø + aø
-R.. U'(C1,1) + E [{ [1- tk]' [F(KI) - 7' Kl] +Kl} . V'(C2,1)]
~ [ , ~ ] { u' (Cll) }Kl .E v (C2,1) . 1- [ ...: ]
E V'(C2,1)
+ {[1- tk]' F(Kl)} . E [V'(C2,1)] - [1- tk]· Kl' E [V'(C2,1) . 7]
Effect of increased risk compensation rate under the split model:
SE
Effect of increased tax on capital income:
a(BuI-Bus)
Otk
aE [V(C2,1)] aE [v(C2,s)]
Otk Otk
E [{ -fJ· (F(KI) - l' Kl) - r- BI}· V'(C2,1)]
-E [{- (r + Jl). R, - r- Bs} . v'(C2,s)]
- {fJ· F(KI) + r· BI} .E [V'(C2,1)] +a Kl· E [V'(C2,1) ·1]
+ {(r + Jl) . k,+ r » Bs} . E [v'(C2,s)]
- {fJ· [F(KI) - 8 - Xl] + r· BI} . E [V'(C2,1)]
+ {(r + Jl) . k,+ r· Bs} . E [v'(C2,s)]
Effect of increased tax on labor income:
a (Bul- Bus)
Otw
aE [v(C2,s)]
Otw
-E [{-F(Ks) +1·k,+ [r + Jll·Ks} . v(C2,s)]
{F(Ks) - [r + Jll· Ks} .E [v(C2,s)] - k..E [v(C2,s) ·1]
{F(Ks) - [r + Jll·Ks} .E [v(C2,s)]
-Ks· {""t~-)'l'il+ E I'il} .E [v(C2,s)]
E v(C2,s)
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Does the Tax System Encourage Too Much Education?
Annette Aistadsæter*
This paper provides an efficiency argument in favor of progressive labor
income taxation. When the consumer faces a trade-off between invest-
ments in financial and human capital, a proportional comprehensive
income tax tends to discriminate in favor of human capital investmentS.
This effect is strengthened when education no longer is a pure invest-
ment, but also holds a direct consumption value.
A comprehensive proportional income tax works as a tax subsidy on
human capital investments, and it reduces the price of education as a
consumption good. By introducing a progressive labor income tax, the
efficiency distortion in the capital market may be partly neutralised.
(JEL: H 21, H 24)
1.lntroduction
During the 1980s and 1990smany industrial countries implemented tax re-
forms that involved broadening the tax base and reducing marginal tax rates.
In some countries the top marginal tax rates on labor income dropped from
70-80% to 40-50%, and this meant a sharp reduction in the progressivity
of the tax system. These reforms were in line with the Schanz-Haig-Simons
principle of comprehensive income taxation with as broad a tax base as pos-
sible. Textbook public economics states a trade-off between redistribution
and efficiency; the government can reduce the degree of inequality but only
at the expense of a larger dead-weight loss; see Stiglitz (1986). This paper
suggests the opposite: an efficiency argument in favor of progressive labor
income taxation and redistribution. When the individual faces the choice be-
'" A previous version of this paper was presented under the title "Optimal income taxation
with endogenous human capital formation". This paper is based on my graduate thesis,
for which I received a grant from The Research Council of Norway (NFR). I am grateful
to my advisor Professor Agnar Sandmo for inspiring guidance and advice. I have bene-
fited from presenting an earlier version of this paper at the 1999 Nordic Workshop on Tax
Policy in Copenhagen, at the SAKI-2000 Workshop on Human Capital and Economic
Growth in Oslo, at the 2001 CESifo workshop on Redistribution and Employment in
Munich, and at. VC Berkeley, and I thank participants and discussants for helpful feed-
back. Especially I would like to thank Eva Benedicte Norman, Jarle Møen, Søren Bo
Nielsen, Peter Birch Sørensen, Tor Jakob Klette, Hans-Werner Sinn, and Geir Asheim.
Tho anynomous referees made valuable and much appreciated comments.
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28 Annette Alstadsæter
tween investing in financial or human capital, a proportional comprehensive
income tax leads to an overinvestment in human capital. A progressive labor
income tax is hence required to correct for the distortions in the investment
market. This effect is strengthened when education is not only viewed as an
investment, but holds a consumption value as well.
It has long been acknowledged in the literature that the tax treatment of
the returns to financial investments can affect the attractiveness of human
capital investments, and that the labor income tax system affects the equilib-
rium level of human capital in the society. Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) inves-
tigate the Scandinavian system of dual income taxation, with proportional
tax on capital income and progressive tax on labor income. The progressiv-
ity of the labor income tax serves to reduce the private return to human
capital investment, thereby offsetting the tendency of a proportional com-
prehensive income tax to discriminate in favor of such investments. Others
have come to the opposite conclusion, namely that a proportional tax on
labor income discriminates against human capital investments and reduces
the educationallevel in the society below the optimal (Nerlove et al., 1993;
Heckman, 1976).
In all of these models, the only reason for the individual to get education,
is higher expected wages. This is a plausible explanation for countries like
the U.S., where wage differentials are large and the wage return to educa-
tion is substantial (see Gottschalk, 1997). The Scandinavian countries, and
especially Norway, have small wage differentials, and a modest return to
education (see Hægeland et al., 1999).According to Moen and Semmingsen
(1996), several kinds of higher education even have negative wage return in
Norway, compared with having only high school. Still, individuals do choose
to get higher education, and the educationallevels in the Scandinavian coun-
tries are among the highest in the OECD. Hence, there has to be other and
possibly more important motives besides higher expected wages behind the
individual's decision to invest in human capital.
Additional motivation for higher education is the possibility to enjoy a stu-
dent life, to learn new things, and to pursue own interests. Higher education
increases the chances of getting an interestingjob. Flexibility between jobs in-
creases through education, and chances are that if he becomes unemployed,
a person with higher education can more easily find a new job. Bishop (1994)
found that for most of the OECD-area the larger part of the unemployed in
the 1980s had no higher education. The social status connected with higher
education is a factor which is not insignificant for the educational decisions.
We cannot rule out that expectations and norms in society have an influ-
ence on whether or not a young person chooses to get education. In fact,
Hægeland et al. (1999) find that the parental educationallevel has a positive
influence on the length of the education their children choose to acquire.
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All of these non-wage related motives behind the educational choice may
be summarized as the consumption value of education. Education may be
viewed as a consumption good, for which the individual is willing to pay. He
accepts a lower wage return to human capital investments in order to receive
the direct utility gain from education. In this case the consumption value
of education is positive. It is also possible that an individual might consider
education as a consumption bad. The individual then has to be compensated
for his disutility of education in order to invest in human capital, and the
consumption value of education is negative.
Little work has been done to estimate the consumption value of education
empirically. Lazear (1977) uses data from young I?en in the U.S. in the period
of 1966-1969, and he finds that lower education is in fact a consumption bad.
People acquire education below the optimal level, and they are willing to
forego wealth in order to avoid the consumption of education. Lazear also
finds that at least for individuals with higher levels of education (MA's and
PhD's) schooling is considered a good. He does not include taxes in his
model.
Few attempts have been made to study the impact of the tax system on
the skill formation in a society when education holds a consumption value
to the individual. Heckman et al. (1998) mention in a verbal analysis that
income tax may have an effect on human capital formation. They argue
that proportional taxation is no longer neutral when nonpecuniary costs
or benefits are present. If the net financial benefit before taxes is positive,
an increased tax rate reduces the investment in human capital. This effect
is even stronger with a progressive income tax. Judd (1999) mentions the
consumption value of education in his tax analysis, but it is not included in
the general optimal tax analysis.
The present paper expands the model of Nielsen and Serensen (1997) by
including the consumption value of education as a motivation behind the
educational decision. Optimal taxes are studied in two cases: First when edu-
cation is a pure investment, and then when education also holds a consump-
tion value. Section 2 presents the general framework and analyzes consumer
behavior in the two models. In section 3 the optimal tax analysis is carried
out for both cases, and the results are compared. Section 4 summarizes the
results.
2.The Model
2.1. The Individual
A representative consumer lives for two periods. These two periods need
not be of the same length. In each period the individual devotes a fixed
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amount of time to leisure. Consider this leisure to be the time necessary for
the individual to eat, rest, and enjoy some sociallife. Let Tl and T2 be the
remaining time in each period. The individual has to decide how much of
the remaining time in the first period to spend on acquiring education E or
working, HI. The remaining time in the second period is spent working, and
hence H2 is given. The individual's time budget is given by:
Period 1 :
Period2 :
Tl =HI +E,
T2 = H2•
(1)
(2)
Individuals leave no bequests, and there are no government transfers.
Thus, labor is the only source of income. The individual has to earn income
equivalent to the value of his consumption, and he has spent all of his income
by the time he dies. Let w be the real wage which is the basic wage for all
workers. This basic labor income is taxed at the rate ti. In the first period all
workers are unskilled and receive the same basic wage if deciding to work.
First period consumption is given by
Cl = w(1 - t/)(Tl - E) - S, (3)
with S being savings in the financial market made in the first period. Savings
may be positive or negative, and we assume that there are no liquidity con-
straints. This implies that the individual may borrow in the financial market
to finance his first period consumption.
Education is another kind of savings. If the individual gets education in the
first period, his wage in the second period increases. Let the function g(E)
represent the return to education, assumed to be increasing and concave
in E. The more time he spends on getting education in the first period, the
higher his second period wage. We also assume that the individual always
gains from acquiring education, i.e. g(E) > 1 and g(O) = 1. This rules out
the possibility that an unskilled worker may get better paid than a skilled
worker. The consumer does not face any direct costs of education, and hence
the only cost of education is foregone labor income in the first period.
The second period wage is given by wg(E). If the individual chooses not to
get any education in the first period, it follows from the definition of the return
function to education that he earns the basic wage w for unskilled workers
in the second period. On the other hand, if the individual did get some
education in the first period, he earns a higher wage in the second period,
and the wage increase depends positive ly on the amount of education. This
wage return to education, [g(E) - 1], is taxed at the rate tho The basic wage,
the wage that the individual receives independently of educationallevel, is
taxed at the rate ti. If t/ = t/r, tax on labor income is proportional, and if
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ti < tir, tax on labor income is progressive'. Return to financial investments,
the real interest rate r, faces the proportional, exogenously given tax rate '1':.
This corresponds to a dual system of income taxation, where tax rates on
labor income and capital income are set separatelyand independently of
eachother.
First period consumption is numeraire, and its price is hence set to one.
Second period consumption is given by
C2 = [1+ (1 - r)r]S + (1 - tl)wH2 + (1 - tlr)w[g(E) - I]H2• (4)
Only the wage return to education is taxed at the rate tir.
By introducing a new notation, we can simplify the representation of
consumer behavior both in the case with and in the case without taxes.
Define the marginal after tax real wage for an unskilled worker as WI; the net
basicwage
WI == (1 - tl)W. (5)
The marginal after tax real wage for an educated worker is defined as WIr,
Wir == (1 - tlr)W. (6)
Using this notation, the net wage return to education is given by wlI[g(E)-
1]H2•
Define p as the relative price of second period consumption, measured in
units of first period consumption,
1
p == 1+ (1- r)r' (7)
The individual's-life time budget constraint is found by combining equations
(3) and (4):
(8)
Education is an investment that yields higher wages in the second period.
But it might also generate non-pecuniary gains, and it is then viewed as
a commodity for which the individual is willing to pay. Hence, education is
included in the individual's utility function, together with first and second
period consumption. The individual's preferences are represented by the
utility function
U = U(C[, C2, E). (9)
All goods are assumed to be normal. The marginal utility of first and second
period consumption, Ul and U2, are both positive. The marginal utility of
1 If ti > th, tbe tax system is regressive. This case is not politically feasible in egalitarian soci-
eties witb great focus on redistribution, as in the Scandinavian countries, and this possi-
bility is hence not considered in this paper.
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education, UE, represents the consumption value of education. If UE is pos-
itive, education generates a direct utility gain to the consumer, and holds an
intrinsic value. The individual considers education to be a good, for which
he is willing to pay. If UE is negative, education is a bad, and the individual
has to be compensated in order to choose education. With UE being zero, we
have the exact situation of the model of Nielsen and Sørensen (1997), where
education is a pure investment and does not generate any non-pecuniary
gains.
The individual maximizes his utility, given that his life time budget con-
straint must bind. From the first order conditions of this problem, we find
the expressions for the marginal utilities of consumption and education:
Ul = A. (10)
U2 = pA, (11)
(12)
The marginal utility of income, A, is positive, and so are the marginal utilities
of consumption in both periods. In this paper we consider the specific case
where education is a consumption good, and compare it with the situation
where education is only an investment alternative. We do not consider the
case where education is a bad, and hence the marginal utility of education is
assumed to be nonnegative.
Manipulating (12) gives the condition for optimal investment behavior:
(1 - 'Z')r = 1 u (1 - t,,)g(E)H2) - 1. (13)
1- ~ (l-tl)
The individual invests in financial and human capital until the net marginal
returns are equal in the two investment alternatives. The private marginal
return to investments in the financial market is the net interest rate, the left
hand side of equation (13). The social return to this investment is the real
interest rate r. With a positive tax on the return to financial market invest-
ments, the social return differs from the private return to the investment,
which is the net interest rate (1 - l)r. The size of the return to human capital
investments depends on whether education is a pure investment, or if it gen-
erates non-pecuniary returns as well. If education is purely an investment
that generates a higher wage in the second period, the marginal utility of
education is zero, and (13) reduces to
(1 - th) -
(1- 'Z')r = (1- ti) g(E)H2 - 1. (14)
Also the private return to human capital investments is reduced by the
taxes. The taxes create distortions since they reduce the private return to the
investments, which is the basis on which the individual makes his investment
decision.
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If we compare the two conditions above, we find that the presence of
a consumption value of education induces the individual to get education at
a lower wage returnthan if education is only an investment. Compared with
(14), the optimal investment condition (13) has an additional fraction on the
right hand side: UE/[(l- t/)wÅ.]. Thisis the consumer's marginal consumption
value of education, measured in net labor income. If the marginal utility of
education is positive, this fraction is positive. It is also smaller than one, which
can be shown by investigating (12). Due to the positive consumption value
of education, the private marginal return to financial investments is higher
than the net marginal wage return to human capital investments in optimum.
Therefore, due to the decreasing return to education, the educationallevel of
the individual is higher when education has a consumption value than when
it is only another investment alternative. If the consumer is to reduce his
educationallevel, he must be compensated for the direct utility reduction.
This means that the interest rate now must be higher in order to make the
consumer give up one unit of human capital and invest in one extra unit of
financial capital instead. The consequences for the optimal tax profile are
important, and they will be discussed thoroughly in section 3.
Combined with the budget constraint, the first order conditions give us
the Marshallian demand functions. The indirect utility function is obtained
by inserting the demand functions into the utility function:
V(w/, Wh,P) == U(Cl(Wl, Wh,P), C2(w/. WI"P), E(Wl, Wh,P».
Using the envelope theorem, we find the first order derivatives of the indirect
utility function. These are needed for the optimal tax analysis.
2.2. The Production Sector
The domestic sector produces one good, which is a perfect substitute for
the foreign good. The price of the foreign good is exogenously given and
normalized to 1.Hence the price of the domestic good also has to be 1. The
industry has a standard neoclassical production function of the form
z= F(K,N),
where Z is the amount produced, K is the total amount of capital in the
industry, and N is total effective labor input. The production function is
linear and homogenous of degree one, so that
Z = Nf(k), with k = ~.
In steady-state, when work effort is constant over time, the total effective
labor input is given by
N = (Tl - E) +g(E)H2•
67
34 Annette Alstadsæter
At each point in time there are two generations in the economy. (Tl - E) =
Hl is the work effort of the young generation, who also invests in education
during the period. The old generation offers g(E)H2 effective units of labor.
Their educational choice has already been made in the previous period, and
hence their educationallevel is given.
The industry demand for capital and labor is given by
f'(k) = r, f(k) - rk = w,
with k being the capital intensity in the industry (capital per unit effective
labor input), and w the real wage per unit of effective labor. From this we
see that domestic capital intensity and the real wage are given by the inter-
national interest rate, implying that domestic pre-tax factor prices remain
unaffected by changes in the domestic tax rates. Saving and labor supply
then only need one period to fully adapt to new tax rates. Hence, only one
transition period is required if the government introduces new tax rates in
the economy.
2.3. The Public Sector
The public sector offers goods and services, and it has a fixed level of expen-
diture. Public expenditure (G) is financed through an exogenously given tax
on financial income (rj.Iabor income taxes (t), and by issuing debts (D). The
government has decided to carry through a tax reform to introduce Pareto-
efficient labor income tax rates. In order for such a reform to be politically
feasible, the government cannot allow an increased tax burden on the cur-
rent old generation, who has adopted to the old tax rates. Hence, tax rates
are chosen such as to maximize the welfare of the current young generation
and all future generations, without reducing the welfare of the current old
generation. In order to balance its budget during the transition period, the
government adjusts the national debt and keeps this new level of debt con-
stant for all future periods. In each period there are two generations, from
which the government receives taxes. With the superscript "O"denoting pre-
reform variables, the government budget constraint for the reform period
becomes
tpwH2 + t~w[g(Eo) - 1]H2 +uSo + ttW(T1 - E) +D = G, (15)
where p = pO, DO = O,and So = (1 - t?)wH~ - Cf.
In the next period, all individuals have fully adapted to the new tax rates.
The government may therefore, without problems, tax everybody according
to the new Pareto-optimal tax rates. In this period, the governmental budget
constraint is
ttW(T1 - E) + ttwH2 + thw[g(E) - 1]H2 +uS = G+ rD, (16)
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where S = (1 - tl)w(T1 - E) - C\ is the savings of the old generation in the
previous period.
By substituting for D from (15) into (16) and manipulating, we find the
public budget constraint:
(1+ r)(w - w/)(T1 - E) + (Wh - w,)H2 + (w - W'r)g(E)H2
+ u(wl(T1 - E) - Cl) - (1 + r)G + rR = O, (17)
3.Optimal Tax Analysis
Taxes on labor income, ti and t'r, are chosen such as to maximize the welfare
of the representative consumer at the least efficiency loss. Consider a tax on
capital income, 'l', as exogenously given. This corresponds to the system of
dual income tax, where tax rates on capital income and labor income are
set separatelyand independently of each other. Two different situations are
considered. First, no tax is levied on capital income, 'l' = o. Second, a positive
tax on capital income exists, 'l' > 0, and political reasons make it impossible
to change this. This situation arises when individuals have income from dif-
ferent sources. some mostly from labor and others mostly from return to
capital investments. Taxing only labor income could have severe distribu-
tional effects and would not be tolerated by the majority of voters. For both
situations we find the optimallabor income tax rates.
In order to compare our results with the results of Nielsen and Sørensen
(1997), we are also interested in finding out whether the optimal tax profile
changes with the introduction of consumption value of education.
Analytically, we maximize the consumer's indirect utility function with
respect to the net wages WI and WIr subject to the public budget constraint.
Using tedious manipulations. the first order conditions of the above max-
imization problem are developed into the condition deciding the optimal
labor income tax rates:
VE ( tr aCI tir) (1 - ti 1+ r ) O- - -- + -- - - (18)WA. 1+ (1- r)r ay 1- th 1- tir 1+ (1- r)r - ,
where aCt/aY is the marginal propensity to consume in the first period",
This is the general expression for the optimal tax condition; let us now look
closer at two specific cases.
2 See the Appendix for the deduction of this optimal tax condition.
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3.1.Case 1: No Consumption Value of Education
With no consumption value of education, UE =O,educationis only of interest
to the individual as an investment alternative. In this case, the optimal tax
condition (18) reduces to
l-tl l+r
1- t" = 1+ (1- 'l)r· (19)
3.1.1. 'f = O
With no tax on capital income, it follows from equation (19) that the Pareto-
optimallabor income tax rates are proportional, ti = t".A proportionallabor
income tax does not influence the investment decision of the consumer. It
taxes the alternative cost ofthe investment (foregone labor income in the first
period) at the same rate as the return to the investment (higher wages in the
second period). A cash-flow tax of this kind levies zero marginal tax on the
return to human capital investments", It is thus a neutral tax on the return to
human capital investments. Combined with zero taxation of financial income,
on the margin the social return on both kinds of investments equals the
private return. This is the first-best solution, and the tax does not create any
distortions in the capital market. Since leisure is fixed in both periods, labor
supply is fixed in the second period. Education is a pure investment that
does not generate any non-pecuniary gains, and hence no substitution effect
arises from taxing labor income. Therefore the proportional tax on labor
income combined with zero tax on capital income is equivalent to a pure
consumption tax.
3.1.2. 'f >0
If there exists an exogenously given positive tax on financial income, we find
from equation (19) that a progressive tax on labor income", ti < t", is optimal.
To understand the intuition behind this result, let us see why a proportional
3 Sandmo (1979) shows the neutrality of a cash flow tax.
4 Given that the public expenditure is constant, one might expect that the additional tax
revenue from taxing capital income would remove the need for taxing labor income. But
in order to minimize the distortions in the investment market caused by the taxes, a pro-
gressive tax on labor income is optimal. The level of the optimal tax rates might change
with the presence of tax on capital income, but this is not treated in this analysis. It is an
open question though, whether tax revenue really increases that much from taxing capital
income. While getting education, the consumer has a possibility to finance his first period
consumption with negative savings. The interest payments in the second period are then
tax deductible, and tax revenue decreases. The progressive labor income tax reduces the
wage return to human capital investments, and thereby reduces some of the distortions
that would arise with a proportionallabor income tax.
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tax on labor income is not optimal in the presence of a positive tax on capital
income. When 'r > Oand ti = th, equation (14) reduces to
(1- 1")r = g(E)H2 -1. (20)
Here we have no marginal tax on the return to human capital investments.
This is because the return to the investment faces the same tax rate as the cost,
measured in foregone labor income in the first period. Return to financial
investments on the other hand, faces a positive marginal tax rate r, This
causes a distortion in the investment market in favor of.human capital. We
see from the above equation that the consumer invests in human capital at
a lower rate of return than in the case with no tax on capital income. Since
education has a diminishing rate of return, this means that he invests more in
human capital than he would do if there were no taxes. This overinvestment
in human capital is counteracted by a progressive labor income tax, reducing
the return to education.
Fisher's separation theorem' states that the optimal investment decision of
the consumer is independent of his preferences. To see this, consider a utility
maximizing individual whose utility depends on the level of consumption in
the two periods of his life. He wishes to allocate income and consumption
over two periods, such as to maximize consumption. He has two means of
moving consumption between periods: he might save in financial capital
with a fixed return, and in real capital with a diminishing return. Maximizing
consumption over his life time is the same as maximizing the present value
of his savings portfolio. The optimal solution is to invest in real capital until
the marginal return equals the fixed return of financial investments. This is
independent of his preferences. Let us now apply this theorem to our context
of educational choice.
The present value of the individual's income is given by
PV = (1 - tl)W (Tl - E + 1+~~ 'r)r)
+ (1 - t,,)w[g(E) - 1] 1+~~ 'r)r· (21)
The individual maximizes bis life time income with regard to bis educational
choice, and we hence get a condition for optimal investment decision, inde-
pendent of his preferences:
(1- til) -
(1- 'r)r = (1_ ti) g(E)H2 - 1. (22)
It is optimal for the individual to invest in education until its net marginal
return equals the net interest rate. Equation (22) determines the individual's
5 Carefully described in Fama and Miller (1CJ72).
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savings portfolio exclusively by maximizing the present value of this portfo-
lio. And the resulting condition is exactly the same as the optimal investment
condition (14) from the individual's utility maximization problem.
The second-best literature states that if a tax-created distortion exists in
one market, then trying to achieve efficiency in the other markets is not
necessarily optimal. But Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) show that aggregated
production efficiency is desirable even though taxation leads to distortions
in one market. This result holds for a general equilibrium model. But even
though our model is a partial equilibrium model, the intuition of Diamond
and Mirrlees may be applied to our context. Substituting for (1 - 11)/(1 - th)
in the optimal investment condition (22) with (19) shows that we might have
efficiency in the investment market even in the presence of taxation:
r = g(E)H2 - 1. (23)
In spite of taxation, we get a solution where the individual composes his
investment portfolio as he would have done in the absence of taxes. But this
result depends on equation (19) to hold. From this equation we see that in
the case of no tax on capital income, r = O,we need proportional tax on labor
income, ti = t'I> in order to achieve efficiency in the investment market. But,
if for some reason there exists an exogenously given tax on capital income,
so that the net return to financial investments is lower than in the absence
of taxes, (1 - r)r < r, then a progressive tax, ti < th, has to be levied on labor
income in order to achieve efficiency in the investment market.
The next step is to investigate the optimal tax rates in the situation where
education no longer is a pure investment, but where it also generates a direct
utility gain for the individual.
3.2. Case 2: Positive Consumption Value of Education
The individual enjoys the consumption value of education, UE >O.Education
is a good for which the individual iswilling to pay. Let us now investigate the
implications this has for the optimallabor income tax rates.
3.2.1. 'l' = O
First, assume that there is no tax on capital income. The optimal tax condition
(18) then reduces to
(24)
From this it follows that the optimallabor tax profile is characterized by
th > 1/.
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We find that even with no tax on capital income, progressive tax on labor
income is optimal. The intuition behind this can be understood by studying
the consumer's optimal investment condition, equation (13).
In case 1, with no consumption value of education, a proportional tax on
labor income is a neutral tax on the return to human capital investments
and does not distort the individual's investment decision. In case 2, when
education is a consumption good for which the individual is willing to pay,
a proportionallabor income tax is no longer neutral. On the contrary, it
discriminates between the two investment alternatives in favor of human
capital. To see this clearly, let T = O, and tJa= ti > O in equation (13), and
compare this with the situation with no taxes at all, T = tJa= ti = O. In both
situations, the left hand sides of the respective variants of (13) have to equal
the real interest wage r.This gives us the following condition:
[1 -] [1 -]r = _ ~ g(E)H2 - 1 = _ Y.E. g(E)H2 - 1 .
(l-I/)wl 1/,=1/>0 wl T=lh=I/=O
(25)
The proportional tax on labor income reduces the wage return to the invest-
ment at the same rate as the alternative cost. But at the same time it also
reduces the price on education as a consumption good, measured in fore-
gone first period labor income. Therefore, the proportionallabor income tax
actually serves as a subsidy on education,
1 1
----;-;-->--1 _]f£_ 1 !lE. '
- (l-I/)wl - wl
and the individual invests in education at a lower wage return than he would
have done in the absence of tax on labor income. For equation (25) to hold,
at least one of the following has to be true: i) the marginal utility of income
is smaller in the presence of labor income tax, and/or ii) the marginal wage
return to education is smaller in the presence oflabor income tax. Both i) and
ii) imply that the educationallevel is higher in the presence of proportional
labor income taxes than in the absence of taxes.
A proportional tax on labor income creates price distortions in favor of
human capital investments, and the consumer chooses to get more education
than in the case with no taxes. Only the wage return to education is reduced
through the income tax, whereas the direct utility return remains unchanged.
Hence the total tax rate on return to human capital investments decreases,
compared with the case where education is a pure investment. But the al-
ternative cost of investing in human capital, the net basic wage, is the same
in the two cases. Put differently, a proportionallabor income tax works as
a tax subsidy on human capital investments, still creating distortions in the
capital market. Return to financial investments must be higher in the case
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with labor income tax in order to shift investments between financial and
human capital. A progressive labor income tax reduces the wage return to
education further, inducing the consumer to invest more in financial capi-
tal. The progressive labor income tax reduces the distortions in the capital
market, and we get a solution closer to the optimum.
3.2.2. 'r >0
Next, look at the case with an already existing positive tax on capital income.
Now it is analytically more complicated to characterize the optimal tax rates
on labor income. When investigating the optimal tax condition (18), we get
the expected result, namely that in the presence of tax on capital income
a progressive tax on labor income is optimal",
This analysis has been purely qualitative, so we cannot conclude about the
optimal degree of progressivity. But intuitively, labor income taxation should
be more progressive when capital income is taxed, than when it is not:
(Ih - II)T={)< (th - 1/)00.
This follows from the fact that the human capital investments increase when
capital income tax is introduced, since this favors human capital investments.
Hence the distortions in the investment market increase when tax on capital
income is introduced. One would therefore expect that a greater degree
of progressivity in the labor income taxation is needed to correct for the
distortions in the investment market. From (18) we see that the surtax t'l must
be substantially higher than the basic labor income tax II for the equation to
hold.
But what happens to the nice production efficiency result we obtained
when education had no consumption value? Substituting for UE/( wA(l- th»
from (12) into the optimal tax condition (18) and rearranging, yields
(
aCI ) UE 1 { - }pir aY +1 WAP = r- g(E)H2 -1 > O.
This implies that the following has to be true:
r > g'(E)H2 - 1, (26)
which should be compared to equation (23) in case 1. From (26) we conclude
that with a positive consumption value of education, the marginal wage
return to human capital investments in optimum is smaller than the marginal
return to investments in the financial market. Education is no longer only
a production factor, it is a consumption good as well. Thus, the previous
efficiency result in the investment market in the presence of taxation breaks
down when education has a consumption value. Also, the Fisher result of
6 The analysis is found in the Appendix.
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separation from the preferences in the investment decision no longer holds.
The consumption value of education adds an additional return to education
that is not represented in the present value of the savings portfolio. Hence the
only optimal investment decision can be made from the individual's utility
maximization.
4. Concluding Remarks
An individual who faces two investment alternatives, financial capital and
human capital, invests in both until their net marginal returns are equal.
Foregone labor income is the only cost of acquiring education. A propor-
tionallabor income tax is then a neutral tax on the return to human capital
investment and does not alter its marginal return. Nielsen and Sørensen
(1997) show that the dual income tax system with proportional tax on capi-
tal income and progressive tax on labor income is optimal in a second-best
world. When a positive tax on capital income exists, a proportional tax on
labor income leads to over-investment in human capital. A progressive labor
income tax reduces the marginal return to education, and the distortions in
the investment market are reduced.
If education, in addition to being an investment alternative, is also a con-
sumption good, this has consequences for the optimal tax policy. A positive
consumption value of education is a tax-free return to human capital invest-
ments. Hence, a proportional labor income tax is no longer a neutral tax
on the return to human capital investments. Even when no tax is levied on
capital income, a progressive tax on labor income is required in order to
reduce the overinvestment in education.
This paper provides an efficiency argument in favor of progressive labor
income taxation. It is worth noting though, that the analysis of this paper is
purely qualitative and cannot conclude on the optimal level of progressivity
in the labor income taxation. Neither does this analysis consider uncertainty,
distributional issues, or possible external effects of education. If direct costs
of education were to be taken into account, a proportional tax on labor
income would no longer be a neutral tax on the return to human capital
investments. This would probably reduce the need for progressive labor
income taxes to correct for distortions in the investment market.
Education is homogenous in this paper, as in most papers in this strand of
the literature. In the model, education generates one rate of wage return and
one kind of consumption value. In reality, different kinds of education have
varying wage returns, as well as different consumption values to the con-
sumer. As far as I know, no attempt has been made to investigate how the
tax system affects the individual's choice of different kinds of education. This
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is an important question, since the educational choices of today's young gen-
eration decide the qualifications of tomorrow's labor force. Hence, today's
tax policy might affect future production possibilities and the productivity of
the country. This is left for later research.
5.Appendix
5.1. Developing the Expressions for the Marginal Utilities (10), (11),
and (12)
max U(Ct. C2, E) s.t. the budget constraint (8).
CI.C2.E
The corresponding Lagrange function is given by
L = U(Ct, C2, E)
- A(Ct + pC2 - wl[(Tt - E) + pH2] - pW"[g(E) -1]H2).
The resulting first order conditions are:
aL- = Ut-A=O,
aCt
aL- = U2 - pA = o,aC2
aL . -
aE = UE - A[WI - pWhg'(E)H2] = o.
5.2. Developing the Optimallnvestment Condition (13)
From equation (12) we have:
UE = A[WI - pWhg'(E)H2]
.IJ-
.!. UE =.!. _ W"g'(E)H2p WIA P W,
.IJ- applying the definitions (5), (6), and (7)
. (1- th) I - . UE
1+ (1- -r)r = (1_ ti) g (E)H2 + [1+(1- -r)r] (1_ t,)WA
.IJ-
(1 - -r)r (1 _ UE ) = (1- til) g'(E)H2 _ (1 _ UE )(1- t,)WA (1- ti) (1- t,)WA
.IJ-
(1 - -r)r = _ ~ (~~= Ih?g'(E)H2) - 1.
1 (t-,,)w,l ti
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5.3. The Derivatives of the Indirect Utility Function
Combined with the budget constraint, the first order conditions give us the
Marshallian demand functions. The indirect utility function is obtained by
inserting the demand functions into the utility function:
V(WI, Wh,p) == U(Ct(w/, Wh,P), C2(WI, Wh,P). E(w[, Wh,P».
Using the envelope theorem, we find the first order derivatives of the indirect
utility function:
av [ -]- =Å (Tt-E)+pH2 ,aWl
av -- = Åp[g(E) - 1]H2.aWI1
(27)
5.4. Developing the Optimal Tax Condition (18)
The government's problem is represented by:
maxV(wl, Wh,P) s.t. the public budget constraint (17).WI.Wh
The Lagrange function of this problem is given by
L = V(WI, Wh,P)
{
(1 +r)(w - wl)(Tt - E) + (Wh - wl)H2 + (w - Wh)g(E)H2}
+p. +rr(wl(Tt - E) - Ct) - (1 +r)G +rR .
The corresponding first order conditions are:
et. av { -H2 - (1+ r)Ht + (1+ r)(w - wl)¥fI ;E }
- = - +p. - ilE aH aE WI ac
aWl aWl +(W - wh)H-zg'(E) aWl+UWI~ aWl+ uHt - rrTw7
=~ Q~
et: av {H2 + (1 + r)(w - WI)~ :!-g(E)H2 } O
-.- = - +p. - ilE aH aE ile =.BWh aWh +(W - wh)H-zg'(E)awh + Trwl~ aWh- u~
(29)
Substituting for the derivatives of the indirect utility function from (27) yields
the following:
Å [Hl +pH2]
{
-H2 - (1+ r)Ht + (1+ r)(w - WI)~~ ;E }+p. _ (WI -O
+(W - wh)H2g'(E) :!+UWI~ :!+ uHt - Tr~ - ,
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{
-aH ilE - lH2 + (1 + r)(w - WI)~ aw - g(E)H2
+ f.t +(w _ W )H d(E).2E.. + Trw ~ aE _ Trae, = O.
h 2.s aWl, I aE aWh aWl,
We know that aHt/aE = -1. Applying this, as well as combining the two
above equations to eliminate the shadow prices f.t and A.. gives the following
condition:
{ - ~ l- - (g(E) -1]H2 - Tr~[HI +pH2] + +;;"[(w- w,,)H2g(E) - (1+r)(w- WI) - TrwI]
- p[g(E) - 1]H2
{
-ile l-H2 - (1+r- Tr)HI- Tr~
+ -+;!, [(w - w,,)H2g(E) - (1 + r)(w - WI) - TrWI]
=0.
which may be reduced to
{[Hl +pH2] ~ - p[g(E) _ l]H2 aE } . { (w - wI!)H~(E) }aWl! aWL -(1+ r)(w - WI) - TrWI
{
- ] aCI - aCI }- Tr [Hl +pH2 - - p[g(E) - 1]H2-
OW" aWL
= O. (30)
From (10) and (11) we know that the marginal rate of substitution between
first and second period consumption equals the discount factor p, which is
independent of the labor income tax rates. Tax changes have no substitution
effects on the consumption in the two periods, only an income effect. The
choice of education in the first period is given by (12). Letting Y denote the
individual's discounted life time income, the budget constraint (8) may be
writtenas
Cl +pC2 = Y, where Y= wI[HI + pH2] +PW/i[g(E) -1]H2•
It follows that
aCI aCI aY aCI { - ee -, }
aWL = oY aWL= ay Hl +pH2 + aWL(pw"H2g (E) - WI) , (31)
and
aCI aCI ay aCI {- - aE - }
OW" = aY aw" = ay pH2[g(E) - 1]+ OW"(pw"H~(E) - WI) .
(32)
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Inserting (31) and (32) into the optimal tax condition (30) reduces this to
{[ -] aE - aE}H,+pH2 -a - - p[g(E) - 1]H2-aW" WI
I(w - wl,)H2g(E) - (1 + r)(w - WI) j_. ac - - O.-rrwi - rrW(pw"H2g(E) - WI)
Increased net top marginal wage for the educated worker affects the educa-
tional choice positively through two channels. It increases the wage return
to education, and it increases the disposable income, inducing the individual
to consume more of all goods, including education. Hence aE/aWh > O. In-
creased net marginal basic wage has two opposite effects on the educational
choice. The substitution effect would induce the individual to get less educa-
tion since the price of education as a consumption good increases, measured
in foregone labor income in the first period. But the income effect induces
the individual to acquire more education. The total effect depends on the
individual's preferences, but it is reasonable to assume that the income ef-
fect at the very least naturalizes the substitution effect. Hence aE/awl :::O.
Even if this last effect should be negative, we might assume that for rea-
sonable values of g(E), the first bracket of (33) is positive. For the optimal
tax condition (33) to hold, the second bracket of this equation has to equal
(33)
zero.
From the first order condition (12) we have that
which we use in the manipulation of the second bracket of (33):
-(1+ r)(w - WI)+ (w - w,,)H2g'(E) - rrwi
aCt -
-rr ay (pw"H2i(E) - WI) = o
.lJ.
(1 + ptr~i)(w, - PW"H2g'(E» + wpH2g'(E) - p(l + r)w = O
.lJ.
(1 +pr/Cl) VE) + (WI _ VE) _!_ _ p(l + r)= O.oY WA. A. w"
Fmally, we get the optimaltax condition (18):
VE ( rr aCt ti') ( 1 - t, 1 + r )
WA. 1+ (1 - r)r ay - 1 - til + 1 - til - 1+ (1 _ r)r =O.
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5.5. Developing the Optimal Labor Income Tax Rates when 'r = O and
UE>O
The optimal tax condition is reduced to (24)
_~ UE + 1 - ti _ 1 = O
1- th wÅ 1- t'l
UE
(1 - ti) - (1 - th) = th wÅ > O
.lJ.
5.6. Developing the Optimal Labor Income Tax Rates when 'r> O and
UE>O
The optimal tax condition (18) has to hold:
(
aCl til) UE 1- ti 1+ r
pir ay - 1 - th wÅ + 1 - th = 1 + (1 - 7:)r'
Weknowthat
l+r 1
) > •1+ (1 - 7: r
implying that the left hand side of (34) is positive and greater than one.
Consumption is assumed to be a normal good in both periods. The marginal
propensity to consume, aCI/ay, is therefore between Oand 1.A reasonable
value of the marginal propensity to consume is 0.5, which is used throughout
the analysis.
The capital income tax lies within the interval
(34)
0::::7:::::1.
We may assume that it is no larger than 0.5, since, in an open economy, capital
flows out of the country if tax rates are too high. In the following analysis,
we let 7:= 0.28, which is the tax rate on capital income in Norway.
By investigating the expressionpr, we find that
r 1
pr = 1 (1 ) < 1 if r < - = 3.57.+ -7:r 7:
That is, the real interest rate must be below 357%, a condition quite likely
to be fulfi1led. Estimating the real interest rate is difficult, since we have not
specified the length of the periods. It is a good approximation to say that
the annual real interest rate is 5%, summing up to 165% over a period of
twenty years. (Here, we include the compound interest.) Assuming that the
individual only has a time span of 20 years when choosing how much to invest
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in human capital, the above condition is met. In the following r = 1.65, i.e.
a real interest rate of 165%.
With these values, the first term in the brackets of equation (34) becomes
tr aCt = -er aCt = 1.65 . 0.28 . 0.5 = 0.106.
p ay 1+ (1 - r)r aY 1 + (1 - 0.28) . 1.65
If the expression in the brackets of (34) is to be positive, the surtax th must
not exceed a critical value. This threshold value of th is:
.-!!!_ < 0.106
1- til t"~< 0.096;
i.e. thmust not exceed 9.6%, which is substantially below the current marginal
rate of income tax. Therefore, the expression in the brackets of (34) is nega-
tive.
We have already stated that the marginal consumption value of education
measured in net labor income, UE/(w).), is positive.
As long as th > 0.096, the first term on the left hand side of (34) is negative.
To make the equality in (34) hold, the following must be true:
1 - ti 1+ r (th aCt) UE 1 + r 1
1- th = 1 + (1- r)r + 1- th - ptr ay w). > 1+ (1 - r)r > ;
(35)
i.e.
ti < tho
These results can be shown to hold for other values of the real interest rate
and of the marginal propensity to consume.
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Chapter 4
Income Tax, Consumption Value of Education,
and the Choice of Educational Type"
Abstract
The educational choice of today's young generation determines the skill
composition of tomorrow's labor force and hence the future production pos-
sibilities. The return to education is one motivation behind the individual's
educational choice. The consumption value is a tax free return to educati-
ton. This paper finds that a progressive tax system induces the individual to
choose more of the educational type with the higher consumption value. This
effect is stronger the more weight the individual puts on the present.
JEL-classifications: H25; I21; I29.
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1 Introduction
The OECD countries as a whole spent 5.8 per cent of their collective GDP on
education in 2001, and 12.7 per cent of total public expenditure was devoted to
educational institutions', Most of these countries offer publicly financed primary
and secondary education, and in many countries tertiary education is also provided
by the state at no direct cost for the individual. Part of the justification for publicly
funded education is the positive effects of education on general productivity''. The
government encourages the individuals to get higher education, focusing on the
amount of human capital in society and to a great extent ignoring its composition.
Different types of education yield different rates of private and social return. It
therefore ought to be of great interest to the government to learn more about the
mechanisms determining the individual's choice of educational direction, and not
only the amount of education. At the very least, one should be aware of which
kinds of distortions the income tax system imposes on the educational choiceof the
individuals. Could it in fact be that the tax system induces the individual to choose
other kinds of education than he or she would in the absence of taxes?
The individual's motivation for choosing higher education may be divided into
four categories. First, education is an investment that yields higher wages later in life.
Individuals invest in education until the expected marginal pecuniary return equals
that of other investment alternatives (Nerlove et al. 1993). Second, education is a
signal of high abilities of the individual and might correct for information problems
in the labor market (Stiglitz 1975).Third, education is insurance against unemploy-
ment (Bishop 1994).Fourth, education offersnon-pecuniary and non-market types of
return, both during the education itself and afterwards (Becker 1964,Lazear 1977).
Among these are the joy of learning new things, meeting new people, moving to a
new city, enjoying life as a student, in addition to the increased status in society that
often comeswith studying in particular fields. It is important to remember that even
if education is treated as homogeneous in the literature, it is in fact a heterogeneous
investment alternative and a consumption good. Thus different kinds of education
generate different levels of joy or satisfaction during the educational process. Also,
different kinds of education require different levels of effort in order to graduate,
lOECD: Education at a Glance.
2See Lucas (1988).
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a factor the student also considers. After its completion, higher education enables
the individual to choose among more interesting jobs. Different educational types
offer different degrees of flexibility with respect to working hours and the regional
distribution of jobs. Individuals with strong preferencesfor where to live or for being
able to work part time will value these qualities strongly when choosing type of edu-
cation. Another feature that differs among the different educational directions is the
effort required by the student to complete the education, and thus also the amount
of leisure available to the student. Let all these non-market and non-pecuniary types
of return to education be summarized as the consumption value of education. De-
pending on their preferences, individuals put different weight on the consumption
value when choosing educational type.
Fredriksson (1997) shows on Swedish data that the demand for education re-
sponds to economic incentives; more students enrolled at the universities in peri-
ods with high expected wage returns or with particularly beneficial student loans
arrangements. The link between the income tax system and the length of the indi-
vidual's education is wellstudied in the literature. Higher education is considered as
an investment alternative in which the individual invests until the expected marginal
pecuniary return equals that of other investment alternatives. Taxes on financial in-
come increase the relative pecuniary return to education, and taxes on labor income
reduce the return to human capital investments (Boskin 1975,Heckman 1976).The
nature of the tax schedule also affects the attractiveness of human capital invest-
ments. If no direct costs of acquiring education besides forgone labor income are
present, a proportional tax on labor income is a neutral tax on the return to human
capital investments. But if a positive tax on capital income exists as well, the com-
prehensive proportional income tax induces the individual to over-invest in human
capital (Nielsen and Sørensen 1997). This effect is even stronger if education has a
positive consumption value as well (Alstadsæter 2003). On the other hand, if edu-
cation requires direct pecuniary investments, a comprehensive proportional income
tax discriminates against human capital investments ('IfosteI1993).
Monetary return to education no doubt is an important factor in the individual's
educational choice, but it is a drawback for the explanatory power of the economic
models that the other motives behind the educational choice are mostly ignored.
For instance, the Norwegian labor force is among the most highly educated in the
8:
OECD3, but still has a compressed wage structure and moderate wage return to
higher education. Where a country like the US at present has an average wage
premium! to an additional year of higher education of 10 %1 the corresponding rate
in Norway is 5,5 %. This is the average wage return over all kinds of education at
the same duration. Still, the number of students at universities and regional colleges
has more than doubled over the last 20 years", It thus seems like the students are
willing to forgo future pecuniary return in order to get the non-pecuniary return
to the educational type of their choice. But different types of education do in fact
generate different rates of wage return, even if they have the same duration.
The educational choice of today's young generation determines the skill compo-
sition and hence the production possibilities of tomorrow's labor force. Small open
economies with high wage levels, like many of the European countries, experience a
flagging-out of their industrial production to low-cost countries. A consensus exists
in these countries that the future economic growth depends on their ability to trans-
fer into knowledge-based industries and innovation production. In order to do this,
a highly educated labor force with the required skill combination is essential. Little
attention has been given to the link between the country's income tax system and
the individual's choice of educational direction. If it is so that the tax system not
only affects how much education the individuals choose to get, but also which kind
of education they choose, then the tax system does indeed affect future production
possibilities.
This paper analyzes how the individual's trade-off between pecuniary and non-
pecuniary return in his choice of educational type is affected by the tax system.
Depending on the individual's preferences, a progressive tax system might in fact
introduce distortions in the individuals's educational choice and induce him to choose
more of the educational type with the higher consumption value. If he also puts more
weight on the present than on the future, this effect is strengthened further. Section
2 presents the model, and the analysis is carried out in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
30ECD: Education at a glance.
4Source: Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002.
SHægeland and Møen (2000).
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2 The model
The representative individual lives for two periods. He has already decided to spend
all available time in the first period on acquiring education. The remaining decision
to make is which type of education to choose. This is in order to focus on the choice of
educational type and abstract from the decisions of whether or not to get education
in the first place and how much education to acquire".
Consider the extreme case where the wage return is either low or high, and
where the consumption value of the educational type is either negative or positive.
No rational individual chooses the educational type with negative consumption value
unless he is compensated through a higher wage return. The individual can choose
between the two" educational types A and B:
Type-A education: Positive consumption value and low wage return.
Type-B education: Negative consumption value and high wage return.
Both types have free admission, and the following model analyzes how taxes
affect the individual's choice between these two kinds of education. If the individual
chooses to get type-A education he puts more weight on the non-pecuniary return
to education and forgoes other consumption since his income is lower than it would
have been had he chosen type-B education. No supply effects are considered in
the present model; as long as the individual wishes to acquire more of one type of
education, he may do so.
The individual chooses the optimal linear combination of the two types of edu-
cation in the first period. The parameters O< EA < 1 and O< EB < 1 denominate
the fraction of available time spent on type-A and type-B education, respectively:
(1)
By combining the two educational types in different manners, the individual has a
continuum of different kinds of degrees to choose from.
6This follows from an simplifying assumption that the choices of how much and which kind
of education to acquire are separable. This is analogous to the litterature on saving and portfolio
choice, where the savings decision is analyzed separately from the portfolio choice.
7There are two more possible combinations of these attributes. No rational individual would
choose the educational type with low wage return and negative consumption value. The last pos-
sibility is an educational type with high wage return and positive consumption value, but which
typically has restricted admission, and therefore is disregarded in the present analysis.
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The fust and second periods are not restricted to having the same duration, and
so the second period may be longer than the fust period. Most people spend more
of their lifetime working then they do acquiring education. The individual is also
assumed to stay in the same job for the whole of the second period. This is the
extreme version of the lock-ineffect that to some extent exists in the labour market;
the individual has full freedom in his choice of educational type, but he has limited
possibility to change this choice after the completion of the education". The time
spent working,H, is given in the second period and independent of the educational
profile chosen in the first period",
In each period the consumer enjoys ordinary consumption and education. Edu-
cation is both a consumption good and an investment alternative. Type-A education
yields a direct utility gain through the positive consumption value, and type-B ed-
ucation increases the individual's income and thus consumption possibilities of first
and second period ordinary consumption. The individual's preferences are repre-
sented by the utility function
(2)
which is increasing in all three consumption goods, Cl, C2, and EA. First and second
period consumption are both assumed to be normal goods, as is type-A education.
It followsfrom equations (1) and (2) that U(Cl, C2, EA) = U(CI, C2, 1 - EB), and
hence the marginal utility of type-B education is negative.
No tuition fees are paid, but the individual needs to financehis living expenses in
the fust period. He borrowsmoney in the financial market at a given interest rate r.
In the absence of liquidity constraints, he finances all his fust period consumption,
Cl , through debt, D. All debt is repaid in the second period. There exist no non-
labor income or intergenerational transfers in the model. His fust period budget
constraint is hence given by:
(3)
BThis is an analogy to the putty-clay hypothesis in production theory (Johansen, 1972), where
there ex-ante is full substitution between labor and capital, while the ex-post production coefficients
are given when the capital is installed.
9Seeing that type-B education leads to a stressful and less enjoyable job that pays better than
the alternative, one might also expect that a job requiring type-B qualifications would demand
longer hours. That aspect is not considered here. Hence the duration of the second period and the
hours worked are independent of the educational profile.
8E
The time spent working in the second period, H, is exogenouslygiven and inde-
pendent of the educational profile.Secondperiod consumption, C2, depends crucially
on the chosen educational profile. The expected wagew is paid to the individual for
all hours he works, independent of educational profile, and it is taxed at the rate two
In addition, the individual receives a positive wage return e to type-B education!".
This additional wage return to education is also taxed at the basic tax rate tw, but
in addition a surtax of te applies. His second period consumption is hence given by:
C2 = [1 - tw] • W • EA . H + [1 - tw] • W • EB • H
+ [1 - (tw + te)] . e- EB . H - [1+ r]· D,
(4)
If te = 0, tax on labour income is proportional, and if te > 0, tax on labour income
is progressive. Obviously, if tw = te = 0, there is no tax on labour income. Both
tax rates are restricted to be larger than or equal to zero, and smaller than one.
Regressive income taxation is no option here. r is the exogenously determined net
interest rate. A change in the tax rates on labor income hence leaves the tax rate
on capital income unaffected!". Thus the net interest rate and the discount factor
are unaffected by the tax on labor income. By combining the equations (3) and
(4), we find the individual's life time budget constraint where type-A education is a
consumption good for which the individual is willing to pay:
The right hand side of (5) represents the individual's full income, which is the
maximum achievable income had he chosen only type-B education. The left hand
side is the different kinds of consumption. Type-A education is nowexplicitly viewed
as a consumption good with a well defined price, namely the present value of the
marginal wage premium by choosing the alternative type-B education. The price
of one additional unit of this type-A education is the income he gives up by not
l°Different types of education have different probabilities of future unemployment, and this
affects the expected wage return to education. A higher probability of unemployment for individuals
with type-A qualifications would imply a large difference in the expected marginal wage returns
to the two kinds of education, with a low wand a high e.
11This corresponds to the Scandinavian system of dual income taxation, where tax rates on
labour and capital income are set separately.
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choosing type-B education. Denote this alternative price of type-A education as
PA:
_ [1 - tw - tel· e .H
PA = 1+r . (6)
The presence of both basic labor income tax tw and the surtax te reduces the price
of type-A education as a consumption good, and the substitution effect of taxes
induces the individual to get more type-A and less type-B education. This effect is
even stronger the higher these tax rates are. The individual makes his consumption
and investment decisions for the whole of his life span in the first period. The higher
his discount rate, the more weight he puts on the present and the less on the future.
That is, the higher the net interest rate r is, the more first period consumption
matters relative to second period consumption, and the more type-A education he
chooses to consume. The opposite is the result the higher the wage return to type-B
education, e, is or the longer the duration of his second period working life, H, is.
Then the substitution effect induces the individual to choose less type-A education.
Even if the income taxes reduce the price of type-A education as a consumption
good, they also reduce total net income. This negative income effect would induce
the individual to consume less of all goods, including type-A education. The total
effect of the taxes on the individual's educational choice is found in the next section.
This is a partial model that only investigates the individual's educational deci-
sion, and hence the government budget constraint is disregarded.
3 The tax analysis.
3.1 The effect of income tax on the educational choice.
In the following, let the prices of first and second period consumption be
Pl == 1,
1
'P2=--- l+r·
(7)
(8)
This allows us to define the price vector P = (Pt,'P2,PA). Also, let the individual's
full income be defined as y :
_ [1 - twl . w + [1 - tw - tel· e Hy- .- l+r . (9)
9C
Applying this new notation reduces the individual's life time budget constraint (5)
to PICI +P2C2+PAEA = y. This new notation simplifiesthe followingdevelopment
of the response function to a tax change in our particular case.
The individual maximizeshis utility under the restriction that his lifetimebudget
constraint is obeyed. Manipulating the first order conditions and utilizing the first
period time constraint, the Marshallian demand functions are found:
So how does the tax on labor income affect the individual's educational choice?
Consider a marginal increase in the tax rates on labour income and investigate how
these influence the individual's division of first period time between type-A and
type-B education. The effects on the two kinds of education are symmetrical. Since
from (1) we have that EA + EB = 1, it follows that 6.EB = -6.EA. Hence it is
sufficient to investigate the effect of tax changes on type-A education. The effect of
a tax change on the demand for education is then given by
aEA aEA apA aEA ay---.-+-.-
ati - apA 8ti ay ati'
i =w,e. (10)
As a response function to a tax change, equation (10) is rather unconventional, since
the income effect enters twice. A tax increase reduces the price of type-A education
as a consumption good. The first element on the right hand side of the equation is
this price effect, which consists of the substitution effect and the income effect of a
tax increase. But type-A education is also an investment alternative, and the tax
reduces the expected return to this investment, measured in expected future wages,
and the second element on the right hand side of (10) is this income effect. Thus
the tax increase affects the individual's educational choice through two sources; it
changes the value of the individual's human capital stock, which in turn determines
his income. It also changes the consumption price on education, by which it affects
the relative wage return to the two kinds of education. For this reason the second
income effect enters the individual's response function.
The first component of the right hand side of (10) reflects how a tax change
affects the price of education as a consumption good. This component consists of
two factors; the first is the price-effect, which shows how a price change alters the
demand for education as a good. The second fraction tells us how much the price
of the educational good A is affected by a tax change. The price-effect consists of a
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substitution effect and an income effect. In this specific case, the Slutsky-equation
takes the form
aEA = aEA III _ aEA . EA
apA apA ay
The total change in the consumption of the educational good A following a price
(11)
change is given by the substitution effect plus the income effect. The substitution
effect states how much a price change affects the individual's consumption of type-A
education when his income is adjusted such that he may achieve the same utility
level. The price change affects the real income and the purchasing power of the
individual. In turn, this affects the achievable consumption bundle of the individual,
and this is the income effect.
A tax change also alters the return to education as an investment alternative,
namely the second period wage. This is represented by the second component of the
right hand side of (10). Increased income induces the individual to consume more of
all normal goods, including type-A education, ~ > O.But increased taxes reduce
total net income, '!Jf < O.The total of these two effects predicts a negative value on
the second component of the right hand side of (10).
Combining all this information, the complete effect of a tax change on the indi-
vidual's educational decision is given by
(12)
Symmetry implies that if the individual chooses less type-A education, he chooses
more type-B education. Also, these changes cancel out, such that the total amount
of education is the same. Hence we know that
i=w,e.
Equation (12) is the general equation; let us now analyze the two cases i = w
and i = eseparately.
3.2 The effect of increased top marginal income tax, te.
The surtax te is levied on the additional wage return e that the individual receives
by choosing type-B education. The effect this surtax has on the individual's choice
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of educational type is found from equation (12) by substituting i = e.
aEA = _ e· H . {aEA 1_ +aEA . EB}.
ate 1+ r apA u ay (13)
Type-A education is a normal good, and the substitution effect of a price increase
is negative. With increased income the individual consumes more of all goods, and
hence the income effect is positive. This tax increase only affects the additional
wage return to type- B education, and the basic wage is unaffected by this. The tax
reduces the individual's disposable income, but at the same time it reduces the price
on type-A education as a consumption good. Whether the increased surtax induces
the individual to increase or reduce the amount of type-A education depends entirely
on which effect is the dominant, the substitution effect or the income effect.
If the substitution effect dominates the income effect, the individual's preference
structure is of a kind that puts great emphasis on the consumption value of type-
A education. The tax increase reduces the price on type-A education measured in
forgone wage return by not choosing type-B education. Thus the individual changes
his educational profile and chooses more of the educational type with the tax free
consumption return. Then ~ > o. The more type-B education the individual has in
his original educational portfolio, the stronger is the income effect. An increased top
marginal tax rate reduces the return to the education with the less advantageous
conditions, and hence the individual chooses less type-B education. This follows
from the symmetry assumption in equation (1). The individual experiences a net
income reduction through two channels; the tax increase and the reduced investment
in type-B education. In order for this to be a sustainable solution, the individual
hence reduces his consumption of the other consumption goods, represented by first
and second period consumption, Cl and C2•
Increased top marginal tax induces the individual to choose less type-A education
and more type-B education if the income effect dominates the substitution effect.
The sign of the effect on the individual's educational portfolio of an increase in the
surtax depends entirely on the income and substitution effects. But the amplitude
of the effect is partly determined by the fraction ~!.The higher the wage return
or the length of the second period is, the higher is the return to type-B education,
and the larger is the effect of an tax increase.
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The importance of the discount rate. The higher the discount rate, the more
the individual values consumption and income in the present, and the less he cares
about the future income when making his educational choice. The present consump-
tion value of type-A education matters more for the individual than the future
expected wages, especially since the price, measured in the present value of future
forgone wages, is reduced through this high valuation of the present. A higher dis-
count rate thus dampens the effect of the tax increase. It also alters the relative
price between ordinary first period consumption, Cl, and the education good A.
The higher the interest rate, the more expensive it is to borrow in the financial
market in order to finance first period ordinary consumption, and this reduces the
marginal rate of substitution between type-A education and ordinary first period
consumption. In our model the discount rate is the net of tax real interest rate. A
high tax rate on capital income would thus reduce the discount rate and increase
the relative price on type-A education.
Increased uncertainty about the future has the same effect as an increased dis-
count rate. If the future wage return to higher education is uncertain, the expected
wage return to type-B education is reduced, and so is the price of type-A education
as a consumption good.
3.3 The effect of increased basic labor income tax, two
The tax rate tw is levied on all wage income earned by an educated worker. From
(9), (6) and (12) it follows that
åEA = _ e .H . {åEA 1_ + [~ + EB] . åEA}åtw 1+ r åPA u e åy (14)
which is equivalent to
åEA åEA w· H åEA
åtw = åte - 1+ r· åy .
As in the previous case, the effect of this increased tax on the composition of the
(15)
individual's educational portfolio depends on the individual's preference structure.
But, since this tax reduces his disposable income from all sources, and not only the
wage return to type-B education, the income effect is more dominant in this case.
Even if the income effect and substitution effect would cancel out in equation (13),
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a tax increase would still induce the individual to consume less type-A education
in this case. This is due to the increased importance of the income effect, since the
overall return to education is reduced. The importance of the income effect is some-
what neutralized by a high discount factor when the individual values consumption
today more than consumption tomorrow.
If the income effect dominates the substitution effect, then the total effect of
an increased basic labor income tax is negative. The reduced income level induces
the individual to reduce consumption of all goods, including type-A education, and
the educational portfolio changes in the direction of less type-A education and more
type-B education. This is also true if the income and substitution effects cancel out.
If the individual has very strong preferences for education as a consumption good,
he might choose more type-A education when the tax increases. In that case the
substitution effect must be so much larger than the income effect as to compensate
for the additional weight put on the income effect through the new fraction on the
right hand side of equation (15).
These are general results. Now consider a specific utility function as described
below, in order to study more closely the importance and sizes of the substitution
and income effects.
3.4 A specific utility function.
Let the utility function be given as the Cobb-Douglas function:
(16)
where both first and second period ordinary consumption and type-A education are
normal goods (a > 0, () > 0, and 'Y > 0)12. The individual's lifetime budget con-
straint is still given byequation (5). The price on type-A education as a consumption
good, PA, and the individual's full income, y, are defined by (6) and (9). In this case
the individual's demand function for type-A education is
(17)
12If a = 0, the model reduces to the pure human capital model where education is a pure
investment alternative and yields no direct consumption value to the individual.
The demand for type-A education depends positivelyon the weight the individual
puts on the consumption value of education, as well as on the relative net wage
return to type-A education. The tax system distorts the individual's educational
choice only as long as it is progressive. A proportional income tax, te = O,does not
affect the individual's choice of educational type.
The higher progressivity in the tax system and the tax free consumption value of
education induce the individual to choose more type-A education. The size of this
effect depends on his relative weighting of this consumption good, "'+~+'Y' The more
compressed the wage structure, that is, the higher ~, the larger is the effect of the tax
increase. By choosing more type-A and less type-B education his disposable income
is reduced, and he thus must reduce his ordinary consumption in both periods. The
lower the after-tax wage return to investing in type-B education, the smaller is the
income loss by choosing more type-A education, and the less ordinary consumption
must he forgo in order to increase the consumption of the educational good.
4 Conclusion.
Economists have thoroughly discussed how the tax system might affect the individ-
ual's educationallevel. But the question ofhow the tax system affects the individual's
choice of educational type has been mostly ignored. The present paper studies this
problem in a simple partial model. A progressive tax system distorts the individual's
educational choice and induces him to choose more of the educational type with the
higher consumption value. The extent of the distortion depends on the individual's
preferences.
Since so many effects are present side by side with the consumption motive in
the educational choice, it is not possible to draw a uniform policy conclusion from
this partial analysis. The main purpose of this paper has been to shed some light on
an ignored effect in the literature on taxes, namely the effect on the relative price
of different types of education as consumption goods. A natural extension of this
model would be to analyze how the presence of uniform and differentiated tuition
fees would affect the educational choice of the individual in the presence of taxation
when education is considered to be a consumption good.
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6 Mathematical appendix.
The first order conditions :
L = U(Cl,C2,EA)
\ (C C2 [1 - t; - tel eHE [1 - twl . [w +el - te . e H)-A 1+--+ A- .I+r I+r I+r
where A is the marginal utility of income, which is positive.
åL
åC
l
= Ul - A = O,
åL A
-=U2---=0åC2 1+r
åL _ U A [1 - tw - tel' e .H - U \ - O
-- - A - - A - APA -
åEA 1+r
Finding the Slutsky-equation (11): By substituting for the demand functions
in the consumer's utility function, we find the indirect utility function, V (p, y):
It is also the minimum utility level in the dual problem, namely the consumer's
expenditure minimization problem. Solving this yields the consumer's expenditure
function, cip, V):
c(p, V) == {ffilnp. [Cl, C2, EA], U(C1, C2, EA) 2: V(p, y)} . (18)
Since expenditure minimization is equivalent with utility maximization, we get
c(p\ V) = y. (19)
The expenditure function is concavein the prices. By Shepard's Lemma, the Hicksian
demand functions are found by differentiating the expenditure function:
h.(p V) = åc(p, V)
• , åPi'
i = I,2,EA• (20)
From the expenditure function and the Marshallian demand function it followsthat
(21)
The Slutsky-equation is found by differentiating (21):
aEA aEA ac ahA
{)PA+Tc .apA = {)PA
.lJ.
aEA = aEAlv_ aEA ·EAapA apA ay (22)
This means that the total effect on the demand for type-A education from a tax
change is given by:
aEA aEA apA aEA ay-=_._+_.-
ati apA ati ay ati
.lJ.
aEA = (aEA Iv _ aEA . EA) . apA + aEA . ay
ati apA ay ati ay ati
.lJ.
aEA = aEAlv' apA + aEA. {ay _ EA' aPA}ati apA ati ay ati ati
Developing equation (13): From (9) and (6) we know that
apA = _ e . H and ay = _ e . H
ate 1+ r' ate 1+ r
Applying the above results reduces equation (12) to:
Developing equation (15): From (9) and (6) it follows that
e-H ay--- and
l+r' atw
[w+ej·H
l+r
Applying the above results in equation (12) with i = w yields
Developing the demand function (17): The individual maximizes his utility
given that his budget constraint binds, and the Lagrange function is then
whith the corresponding first order conditions
(23)
a£ _ 'Y ,x _ O
aCl - C2 - 1+ r -
===} C
2
= Cl . 'Y. (1+ r)
()
(24)
a£ a
-=--'x·PA=O
aEA EA
(25)
a£ [1 ]- = - Cl + -- .C2 +PA.EA- Y = Oa,X l+r (26)
The marshallian demand functions are found by combining the first order conditions.
From (26) it follows that
1
Cl = Y - -- . C2 - PA . EA1+r
.IJ, (24) and (25)
1 'Y·(1+r) aCl = Y - -- . Cl . - PA· Cl . --
1+r O O·PA
.IJ,
O
Cl = Y . -a-+-O'--+-'Y
Applying this expression in (25) yields
a O a
EA = Cl . -- = y. ---
O·PA a+O+'Y O·PA
.IJ,
The individual can at most achieve the utility level V, and evaluated at this
point, the compensated demand function is identical to (17). Thus the substitution
effect is given by
åEA a
åPA lu=v = -y. (a+O+'Y) .p~'
while the income effect is given by
åEA a--·EA=y· 2·
åy (a+O+'Y) .p~
åEA a
åy (a+O+'Y) ·PA
(27)
(28)
[1 - tw - tel· e
PA= ·Hl+r

Chapter 5
Measuring the Consmnption Value of Higher
Education"
Abstract
The consumption value of education is an important, but rather ignored
factor behind the individual's educational choice. This paper suggests a
method for measuring the consumption value of education in a compensating
differentials framework when the ability bias is corrected for. As an example,
the willingness to pay for the consumption value of attending teacher's college
during the 1960's is estimated on unique Norwegian panel data. The ex-ante
price of the consumption value of teacher's college is estimated to be 38 %
of the present value of the individual's potentiallifetime income. The ex-post
price of this consumption value is for the same individuals estimated to be
about 46 % of the present value of the potential lifetime income.
JEL-classifications: J24; J31; J33; 121;H89.
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1 Introduction.
Higher education can be viewed both as a consumption good for which the individual
is willing to pay, arid as an investment alternative that yields higher wages later
in life. The factors determining the individual's educational choice can be divided
into three groups: preferences, returns, and costs. The costs of attending higher
education are effort, time and money, both direct monetary outlays and forgone labor
income'. The return to higher education comes both as pecuniary and non-pecuniary
returns. As higher education increases the skilllevel, and thus also the productivity
of the individual, he is paid a higher wage in the labor market. Also, higher skilled
individuals qualify for different types of jobs than lower skilled individuals. High-
skilled jobs often offer various fringe benefits, which are not paid as money, but
which are all equivalent to a wage increase. Fringe benefits- and the wage premium
constitute the pecuniary return to higher education. The individual specific non-
pecuniary return to higher education is the intrinsic or the consumption value of
education, which is defined in section 3.
This paper suggests a method for measuring the consumption value of education
in a compensating differentials framework when the ability bias is corrected for. The
identification strategy is to compare two individuals who attended teacher's college
and business school respectively in Norway during the 1960's. In this period these
two types of education required the same minimum average grade level from high
school for admittance, but they generated very different wage returns. The wage
return from attending business school in this period is used as a benchmark for
the potential wage return of the teacher's college graduates. Using the Norwegian
1970 census, cross section wage profiles are estimated for those business school and
teacher's college graduates with different levels of working experience. These wage
profiles are interpreted as the expected future wages of the individuals attending
business school and teacher's college during the 1960's. The ex-ante price of the
consumption value of teacher's college is estimated to be 38 % of the present value
of the individual's potentiallifetime income. Using unique Norwegian panel data the
actual wage profiles for the individuals acquiring their education during the 1960's
are estimated. The ex-post price of this consumption value of teacher's college turned
1Costs are disregarded in the following analysis.
2Fringe benefits are here defined to be benefits with a clear monetary equivalent, such as a
company car, free newspaper subscriptions, and a company health insurance.
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out to be about 46 % of the present value of their potentiallifetime income.
The goal of the paper is not to find the exact value of the willingness to pay
for the consumption value of education, but rather to establish as a fact that the
consumption value of education does exist and that it is an important factor behind
the individual's educational choice.As shown by the example, many individuals are
willing to give up substantial future wage returns in order to acquire the educational
type of their choice. Therefore, the consumption value of education should not be
ignored when modeling the individual's educational choiceand estimating the return
to education.
The paper is organized as follows:Section 2 gives an historical overviewof the
debate on the return to education, and section 3 discusses and defines the concept
of consumption value of education. The estimation of the monetary value of the
consumption value of teacher's college relative to business school is conducted in
section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Higher education: Investment or consumption?
Prior to the human capital revolution in the 1960's, education was considered to be
a consumption good. One shortcoming of this framework was that it ignored the
fact that pursuing education actually increases the productivity of the individual
and his wages in the next period. Schultz' (1960) and Becker (1964) introduced
the theory of human capital, where education is an investment that increases the
individual's wage in the next period. The individual acquires education until the
present value of the expected marginal wage return equals the marginal return of
other investment alternatives. The cost of the investment is the sum of the direct
costs, such as tuition fees, books and other expenses, and forgone labor income.This
theory was highly controversial at the time, since education was considered to be a
cultural good. Schultz (1960) stated that "it is held by many to be degradingto man
and morallywrong to lookupon his educationas a way of creating capital.... For them
educationis basicallycultural and not economicin its purpose,becauseeducationserves
to developindividualsto becomeresponsiblecitizens. ...My reply to those who believe
3"1 propose to treat education as an investment in man and to treat its consequences as a form
of capital. Since education becomes a part of the person receiving it, I shall refer to it as human
capital." Shultz (1960).
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thus is that an analysis that treats education as one of the activities that may add to
the stock of human capital in no way denies the validity of their position ... Some kind of
education may improve the capabilities of a people as they work and manage their affairs,
and these improvements may increase the national income."
Mincer (1974)4 developed.the framework which is still the most frequently used in
the empirical estimation of the wage return to education. A simplifying assumption
in this model is that the wage return to job experience and the wage return to
education can be estimated separately. In his model, the log of the individual's
earnings, Y, in a period can be decomposed into an additive function of a linear
education term and a quadric experience term:
(1)
where E is the length of the completed education in years, X represents the num-
ber of years of work experience" after leaving school, and E is the residual. The
parameter /32 is then the rate of return to an additional year of education. This
marginal return to education is assumed to be independent of both type and level of
education. /33 represents the return to experience, which is expected to be concave,
and /34 estimates the extent of this concavity. But there are problems with this ap-
proach. It assumes that education increases the individual's wage, but it could also
be that this is a result of individuals with high innate income potential choosing to
acquire higher education, such that there is an ability bias in the sample. Also, the
relationship between occupational choice, earnings, and job attributes is simultane-
ously determined; the reward structure determines the educational choice, and the
educational choice determines the reward structure. Thus the amount of schooling
included in the wage equation is not exogenous, and a simultaneity problem ex-
ists. Another problem is that there is heterogeneity in the wage return to human
capital investments. Willis and Rosen (1979) claim that this induces the individual
to choose the type of education for which he has a comparative advantage given
his innate abilities. The analysis in the present paper concentrates on solving the
selection problem.
Increasingly sophisticated econometric methods have been developed to correct
for the above described estimation problems, and this has been the focal point in
4See Chiswick (2003) for a retrospective discussion of the importance of Mincer's contribution.
5In the absence of direct information on work experience Mincer suggested to use "potential
experience", which is the individual's age minus his school starting age minus years in school.
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the empiricalliterature over the last twenty years," The existence of other motives
for the individual's educational choice besides higher future wages has been more
or less ignored. Instead of analyzing what motivates the individual's educational
choice, the effort has been concentrated on analyzing the most easily measurable
outcome of this choice, namely the effect on wages.
But economics is the theory of choice, and it deals with the satisfaction of human
desires through choice of actions. Human desires are satisfied by human interaction
and through economic activity, which is the exchange of goods and services. Plato
defined three types of desires; desire for wisdom and knowledge, for honor, fame,
and power, and the appetitive desires, which are usually satisfied through spending
money. The satisfaction of these desires is motivated and accompanied by pleasure,
which is necessary up to a point and harmful when pursued in excess. Marshall
distinguished between wants and activities. Wants are satisfied by consumption of
services and goods, while activities either contribute to the production of goods and
services or are pleasurable in themselves.
Adam Smith was the first to formulate the idea of monetary and non-monetary
compensations of a job, an idea later formalized in the compensating differentials
literature: "The five following are the principal circumstances which, so far as I have been
able to observe, make up for a small pecuniary gain in some employments, and counterbal-
ance a great one in others: first, the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the employments
themselves; secondly, the easiness and cheapness, or the difficulty and expense of learning
them; thirdly, the constancy or inconstancy of employment in them; fourthly, the small or
great trust which must be reposed in those who exercise them; and fifthly, the probability
or improbability of success in them. ...Honour makes a great part of the reward of all
honorable professions. In point of pecuniary gain, all things considered, they are generally
under-recompensed .... Disgrace has the contrary effect."? Later Marshall (1920) stated
that "the true reward which an occupation offers the labourer has to be calculated by
deducting the money value of all disadvantages from that of all its advantages" .
The fact that activities can be pleasurable in themselves and help satisfy certain
desires has for a long time been widely ignored in the economic literature. There
are a few exceptions, though. Lazaer (1977) finds in his sample of US males that
lower levels of higher education are considered a consumption bad by the individual,
6See Card (1999) for an extensive literature overview of this field.
7The Wealth of Nations, Book 1, Ch. 10, Part l.
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while MA's and PhD's are considered to be consumption goods", Oosterbeek and
van Ophem (2000) allow the individual to have immediate utility from schooling,
and individuals maximize lifetime utility instead of the usual lifetime income ap-
proach. They find that the young Dutch individuals in their sample invest too much
in education compared with what is optimal from the human capital theory, and
they conclude that the consumption motives with regard to schooling are indeed
important". Kodde and Ritzen (1984) combine the human capital model and the
consumption model and find that the individual demands more education than in
the pure human capital model. This could be due to the direct utility gain he expe-
riences through the consumption of education. Oosterbeek and Webbink (1995) find
that the integrated model where education is both an investment alternative and a
consumption good is the best to explain the educational choicesof the young indi-
viduals, and that both the consumption motive and the investment motive matter.
The shortcomings of the pure human capital model in explaining the individuals'
educational choices are also pointed out by Oreopoulos (2003).
More work has been done on identifying different non-pecuniary returns to a
particular job, such as pleasant working conditions or status. Examples are Antos
and Rosen (1975), Ward and Sloane (2000), and Scott (2001), who all apply the
compensating differentials framework described in Rosen (1986).
Stern (1999) considers a sample of postdoctoral biologists who decide where to
start working, and who are offeredjobs with different job characteristics. The result
suggests a strong negative relationship betweenwages and the opportunity to engage
in scientific activity; the biologists have to pay, in forgone wages, to be able to do
scientific work. Firms who allow their employees to publish papers based on their
results from the job pay on average 25%lowerwages than the firms who do not allow
their employees to engage in academic activity. This line of reason is also followed
by Klette and Møen (2002), who state that academics pay a considerable price for
their academic joy, measured in forgone labor income by not working in the private
sector.
The literature also mostly ignores that different types of education generate dif-
8Gullason (1989) also finds a positive "consumption value" to schooling for US males, where
most of this value consisted of avoiding being drafted for the Vietnam war as long as the person
was in school.
9This idea was already promoted by Schaafsma (1976).
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ferent rates of wage return. Education is assumed to be a homogenous good that
generates an annual rate of return. One exception is Keane and Wolpin (1997).
In a dynamic structural model they consider self-selection in three heterogenic di-
mensions: schooling, work, and occupational choice, and they find that most of the
variance in lifetime utility is explained by inequality in skill endowment. Aakvik et
al. (2003) also find on rich Norwegian panel data that the wage return to education
is heterogenous among individuals.
Although the existence of non-pecuniary returns to education is acknowledgedin
the literature, they are seldom included in the formal analysis. The non-pecuniary
returns to education are mostly only mentioned anecdotally, and a proper definition
of the consumption value of education is to my knowledgemissing in the literature.
The discussion below aims at correcting for this.
3 Non-pecuniary returns to higher education.
Acquiring higher education has many effects; some serve as incentives for the in-
dividual at the time of the educational choice, whereas others are by-products of
the educational process. The non-pecuniary return to higher education can from
the individual's point of view be divided into two groups; intended and unintended
non-pecuniary benefits. The consumption value of higher education is the intended
non-pecuniary returns to education; these are the factors the individual is aware of
at the time of the educational choice. But there are other non-pecuniary returns to
higher education, of which the individual may not be aware at the time of his educa-
tional choice. These are the unintended non-pecuniary returns to higher education.
3.1 The consumption value of higher education.
Substantial non-pecuniary advantages and returns to education exist, both during
the educational process and after its completion. Duncan (1976) defined the con-
sumption benefits of a job as the positive flowof satisfaction provided by the work
situation. This may be enjoyment, interest, challenge,and social relationships, which
are all subjective relations of individuals to the job situation. Higher education en-
ables the individual to choose from a broader specter of jobs that are mostly con-
sidered more interesting and more challenging (Weisbrod, 1962). Higher education
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makes the individual more flexible in the type of job he is able to perform, as well
as in where to perform it, which provides insurance against unemployment (Bishop,
1994). This flexibility varies between different types of education, and individuals
who prefer to live in a particular area or who prefer the option of part-time work
will choose educational types that lead to jobs with these attributes.
Different types of education differ in how much effort is required from the indi-
vidual to complete the education. The effort level required in the jobs available after
completed education also varies. Loweffort input and thus much leisure are qualities
valued by many individuals. There is also a non-dismissable increase in social status
from completing a higher education. Dolton et al. (1989) find that among arts and
social science graduates it seems like occupational status plays an important role in
the educational choice.
The consumption value of education while acquiring it consists among other
things of the joy of learning new things, meeting new people, moving to a new city,
and participating in campus and student activities, in addition to the increased
status in the society that often comes from being a student of particular fields!".
Nerdrum (1999) discusses this in detail and states that "some people choose to become
students mostly to be able to take part in such a way of life. Their aim is principally
directed towards immediate consumption, and they consider the other effects, like positive
monetary returns, as pure positive by-products" .
I summarize all these non-pecuniary returns to education as the consumption
value of education.
Classification difficulties. Not all non-pecuniary returns to education are
straightforward to classify. For instance, Nerdrum (1999) states that memberships in
clubs and organizations during their time as a student provide the individuals with
a network of people spread over the world, both for professional and private pur-
poses, which often prove to be extremely valuable. If having this network provides
the individual with an intrinsic joy, it should be counted as part of the consumption
value of education. But if this network furthers his career, it is a kind of investment
during the education that yields a future monetary return, and it should not be
IOScitovsky (1976) states that as countries get richer and the individuals have more leisure,
they need satisfaction to avoid boredom. He also states that education is one such stimulus that
increases satisfaction both during and after the educational period if chosen correctly.
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regarded as a consumption value of education.
The fact that one educational type requires less effort both during the educational
process as well as in the future jobs is above defined as a consumption value, since the
individual enjoys having more leisure. But one could also claim that this educational
type has lower investment costs, measured in effort.
3.2 Unintended non-pecuniary returns to education.
When making his educational choice, the individual maximizes his ex-ante prefer-
ences, and thus the consumption value of education ought to be measured at this
point in time. The educational process might change his preferences, such that his
ex-post preferences differ from his ex-ante preferences, along with his ex-post val-
uation of the consumption value of education. These changes in preferences are
ex-ante unforeseen. They do not serve as a motivation behind the individual's edu-
cational choice, and should thus not be included in the ex-ante consumption value
of education. See Sandmo (1983) for a discussion of ex-ante versus ex-post welfare
evaluations.
Unintended individual returns. The human capital theory allows for the exis-
tence of consumption effects of education, but they are only mentioned anecdotally
and consist of factors such as learning to appreciate opera and reading Goethe in
the original language!'. These changes in preferences are unintended, since they are
results of influence on the individual during the time of his education. They are
not the result of a conscious choice, since he did not treasure these things at the
time of the educational choice. Individuals make their educational choice in order
to maximize their utility according to their ex-ante preferences. Thus this effect is
not part of the consumption value of education as defined in this paper.
If interpreted within a framework similar to the" Rational Addiction" 12 approach
of Becker and Murphy (1988), or more generally the "Extended Preference" approach
of Becker (1996), the conclusion is the opposite of the one above. These approaches
generalize the usual discounted utility model, by letting the instantaneous utility in
any given period be a function of past consumption experiences. In the intertemporal
llSee for instance Judd (2001) and Nerdrum (1999).
12See Wangen (2003) for a discussion of this.
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optimization problem, the rational consumer takes into account that even if he
prefers rock music to classical music in the present period - according to today's
instantaneous utility function - he foresees that the educational process changes his
future instantaneous utility functions in a way that will make him prefer classical
music.
Preferences: Shifts and history dependence. In most economic models indi-
viduals' preferences are assumed to be exogenously given and constant over time,
when they are in fact influenced and shaped by the surroundings. New information,
learning, experience, innovation, and human interactions affect the individual and
might induce a shift in his preferences over time. If the individuals were to make
their educational choices at the age of five, we would have nations of firemen! This
section discusses these preference shifts in more detail.
Croix (2001) claims that intergenerational spillover has taste externalities, as
when fear of insects or career aspirations are transmitted from parents to children.
Hægeland et al. (1999) find that parental educationallevel has a positive effect on
the length of the education the children acquire. Preferences are also transmitted
through the habit formation effect, which reflects the effects of past decisions on the
perception of current outcomes. Different aspects of the consumption value of higher
education can be subject to history dependence, as stated by Acemoglu (1995). New
generations learn from older generations and to some extent inherit established value
judgements and attitudes. For instance, what is perceived to give social status and
prestige changes over time as the external factors such as political regime, religion,
and economics change'", This affects who chooses the different occupations and thus
also the distribution of talent in the society.
Bowles (1972) argues that "there is considerable evidence that rich, high status
parents place a larger value on the non-pecuniary aspects of work and a lower value on
monetary returns than poorer, lower status parents". Osterbeek and van Ophem (2000)
find support for this; the consumption motive for the educational choice seems to be
13Acemoglu (1995) mentions as an example the fall and rise of the merchant's status in the
Mediterranean area: "The arrival of Islam in the Mediterranean in the eight century stopped
commerce through this sea to a large extent. This lead to the disappearance of merchants. In the
twelfth century, the Christian counterattack against Islam started and Europeans took once again
control of the Mediterranean. This gradually led to the renewed trade and to the activity organized
around towns and merchants."
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more important the higher the social background the individual has, and the better
skilled he is. They also find that children of highly educated fathers or fathers with
higher level occupations have lower discount rates than children of lower educated
fathers or fathers with lower level occupations. This means that a child from a poorer
family seems to attach lowerweight to future earnings than children in richer families
do.
As individuals' preferences might change over time, so might their discount rates.
Most individuals acquire higher education when they are young. One could claim
that young people in general have short time horizons and high discount rates when
making their choices. Thus they put more weight on the present consumption value
of education than on the future income possibilities when making their educational
choice. Later in life they might regret this and have a lower willingness to pay for
the consumption value of education (measured in forgone labor income). This type
of time inconsistency and hyperbolic discounting is discussed by Ainslie and Haslam
(1992). This problem is avoided in the following empirical analysis by applying the
individuals' ex-ante preferences in the estimation of the price of the consumption
value of education and assuming a constant discount rate.
Social returns to education. The altered preference structures during the edu-
cational process have positive effects on the welfare in the society if they induce the
individual to take better care of his health and to become a better citizen. Lochner
and Moretti (2001) find that education has a causal negative effect on incarceration,
Lleras-Muney (2002) finds that education has a causal negative effect on mortal-
ity, while Milligan et al. (2003) find that schooling improves civic participation in
political processes. Also, higher education has a positive effect on economic growth
through technological innovation from increased knowledge spill-overs (Lucas, 1988,
and Romer, 1990). These are all reasons why many countries subsidize higher edu-
cation substantially.
3.3 Uncertainty.
As the individual makes his educational choice based on his expectations of the
returns to the investment, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, there is considerable
uncertainty present. It might very well be that he has incomplete information of the
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content and thus also the consumption value of the education, or that his preferences
change during the education process, as discussed above. Also, since there is a sub-
stantiallag from when the investment decision is made to when the pecuniary return
is generated, he needs to make this investment decision based on his expectations
of future wages, job openings, taxes etc. Due to poor information, business cycles,
politics, and his future health these expectations are uncertain and very much based
on the present situation in the society at the time when he makes his educational
choice. When making his educational choice, the individual has a full range of types
to choose from, but after the completion of the education he has limited options of
which careers to pursue, and this represents a potential lock-in effect.
4 A method for measuring the consumption value
of higher education.
I apply the compensating differentials framework to measure the consumption value
of teacher's college. The model is described below, along with the data and the ap-
proach to correct for the innate abilities of the individuals. The results are presented
and discussed in the last part of this section.
4.1 Compensating differentials.
Rosen (1986) states that the theory of compensating differentials "refers to observed
wage differencesrequired to equalize the total pecuniary and non-pecuniary advantages
or disadvantages among work activities and among workers themselves". A modified
version of Rosen's model will in the following be applied to measure one particular
individual's valuation of the consumption value of type-A education when type-B
education is used as benchmark.
The individual maximizes his utility U, which depends positivelyon both ordi-
nary consumption C and the consumption value ei of education Ei :
U = u(C,ei), i=A,B.
ei is an index of the consumption value of type-i education; the higher the consump-
tion value, the higher the value of ei. The consumption value index is individual-
specific, such that when one individual has higher consumption value of type-A
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education, another individual may have higher consumption value of type-B educa-
tion.
Assume that all' income is consumed, and that the individual only lives for one
period. He acquires education at the beginning of the period and works and consumes
in the end of the period. His consumption level thus equals his wage income, C = Wi,
where the net of tax wage level depends on the type of education chosen. The
individual's utility function can be written as
i=A,B. (2)
Both variables are continuous, and fringe benefits are not considered. There are no
non-wage types of monetary income in the model. This is a one-period model, but Wi
and ei can be viewed as the present values of lifetime income and consumption value
that the individual experiences by choosing type-i education. At the beginning of the
period the individual makes his educational choice, and he may choose between the
two educational types A and B, which differ in both consumption value and wage
return. For this particular individual, type-A education has the higher consumption
value:
(3)
For a given wage return, w, to both kinds of education, the individual always prefers
type-A education, since it holds the higher consumption value to him:
The decision is more complicated if the wage return differs between the two types
of education. Then the combination of individual preferences, wage return, and
consumption value of the educational type determines which is preferred. Let w'B
be the wage return to type-B education that the individual requires in order to be
indifferent between the two educational types when type-A education has the wage
return WA:
(4)
Since type-B education is never preferred to type-A education if they have the same
wage return, it follows that
(5)
Now define the difference
D=W'B-WA
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as the individual compensating differential for type-A education compared with type-
B education. The individual compensating differential D is the additional wage
return to type-B education necessary to make the individual indifferent between
the two educational types at their given consumption values. Thus D is the wage
return that the individual is willing to forgo in order to enjoy the consumption value
eA ruther than ee- This willingness to pay for the consumption value of type-A is
individual-specific. For now we only consider one individual, but when we expand
the model to consider a group of individuals, D will vary among the individuals
choosing type-A education.
Let W be the market compensating wage differential, defined as the difference in
the market wage returns to type-B and type-A education.:
(6)
The market offers the individual the additional wage return W if he chooses type-B
education and forgoes the additional consumption value he could have enjoyed by
choosing type-A education. If the individual compensating wage differential is the
same as the market compensating wage differential, D = W, then the individual
is indifferent between the two types of education. If D < W, the market offers a
greater wage compensation for choosing type-B education than is required by the
individual. He chooses type-B education and thus increases his consumption level
by more than what is required to compensate for the utility loss by not enjoying the
consumption value of type-A education. On the other hand, if D > W, the individual
chooses type-A education, since the wage premium by choosing type-B education is
less than what is required to compensate for the utility loss he experiences by not
choosing type-A education.
Now consider figure 1, where an example of one particular preference structure is
displayed. Type-A education offers the reward structure (eA, WA), point a, and type-
B education offers the reward structure (eB, WB), point b. The individual requires
the wage wB in order to be indifferent between the two kinds of education, and here
WB > WB· The individual compensating wage differential, D, is given by the vertical
distance between points c and a, while the market compensating wage differential,
W, is given by the vertical distance between the points b and a. Thus, at this given
preference structure and wage structure the individual is under-compensated by
the wage return to type-B education for forgoing the consumption value of type-A
education, D > W, and the individual chooses type-A education.
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Figure 1: Individual and market wage differentials and the choice of educational type.
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The market compensating wage differential, W, is the market price of the con-
sumption value of type-A education, and it is available to all individuals. Still,
individuals differ in their preferences, and so does the individual compensating wage
differential, D. As an example, let the educational preferences of all individuals be
distributed over the individual taste variable D as illustrated in figure 2. Assume
that they all have the same level of innate abilities. The average value of the individ-
ual compensating wage differential is represented by E(D). As already discussed, the
individual's preferences might change due to external influences. This would shift
the distribution of preferences and also the average value of the individual compen-
sating wage differential. The market offers the compensation W to the individuals
who forgo the consumption value of type-A education and instead choose type-B ed-
ucation. In this specific case W < E(D), and the majority of the individuals choose
type-A education, since the forgone labour income by doing so is less than the price
they are willing to pay for the consumption value of type-A education, D. As W
increases, some individuals are no longer willing to forgo that high a wage return
in order to enjoy type-A education, and more individuals choose type-B education.
The individuals who choose type-B education have the lowest preferences for the
consumption value of type-A education. Since individuals differ in taste, their reser-
vation wage return, D, also differs. This ensures the existence of economic rent in the
labour market. Most individuals who choose type-B education receive an economic
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Figure 2: Distribution of individual compensating wage differentials and the choice
of educational type.
Individuals who
choose type-B
education.
W E(D)
rent of the sizeW - D. The marginal individuals earn no economic rent, while most
individuals who choose type-A education also receive an economic rent, since their
willingnessto pay for the consumption value of type-A education is higher than the
actual price demanded by the market in the form of the market compensating wage
differential. The conclusion from this is that the market compensating wage differen-
tial W serves as a lower bound on the willingness to pay for the consumption value
of type-A education among the individuals choosing it.
Income taxes. In the above model, the market compensating wage differential
W is defined in the absence of taxes. Intuitively, one would expect income taxes,
T, to reduce the net market compensating wage differential, Wn, available to the
individual:
Wn=W-T.
The consumption value of education is a tax free return to human capital invest-
ments. Progressive income taxes reduce the wage return to type-B education rela-
tively more than the wage return to type-A education, and this could reduce the net
market compensating wage differential. See Alstadsæter (2003) for a discussion of
how the tax system might induce the individuals to choosemore of the educational
type with the higher consumption value.
But the above discussion implicitly assumes that the gross wage differential is
unaffected by taxes, which is usually not the case. As Persson and Sandmo (2002)
120
show in a special case, increased progressivity in the tax schedule might actually lead
to higher after tax wage inequality. To say anything about the effects of different
tax schedules on the net of taxes wage differentials requires a thorough .discussion on
the wage determination mechanisms, but this goes beyond the scope of the paper.
Selection problem. The market compensating wage differential might be mea-
sured by comparing two types of education with different consumption values. If all
individuals had the same level of innate abilities, the difference in the wage return
to the two educational types would be the individual's average minimum willingness
to pay for the consumption value of the more beneficial educational type. But dif-
ferent individuals have different innate abilities, experiences, and personalities. The
wage return to the educational type is now partly endogenous, depending on innate
individual ability. The individuals also have different views on which educational
type has the higher consumption value.
The selection problem can be accounted for by finding two individuals with the
same level of innate ability, but who have different preferences and make differ-
ent educational and career choices. One possible approach to this is the growing
identical-twin study literature (see Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1998). This strand of lit-
erature utilizes surveys on identical twins, who are assumed to have the same level of
innate abilities. The wage return to one additional year of education is estimated by
using the earnings of the other twin as a benchmark for the given ability level. But
this method is controversial. Bound and Solon (1999) state that "even monozygonic
twins are a little different, and their (often small) differencesin abilities and temper may
contribute to their (often small) differencesin schooling."
This paper proposes an alternative approach. The identification strategy is to
compare individuals with approximately the same grade level at high school grad-
uation, but who choose different types of higher education. Grades are here used
as an instrument for ability. The individuals who attended teacher's college (type-
A education) during the 1960's could have attended business school (type-B) and
experienced a much higher wage return but chose the higher consumption value of
teacher's college. Thus wage return to business school is the benchmark for their
potential future wage return'". The educational choice here also implicitly means
l1This does not mean that business school has a low or negative consumption value for the
individuals actually choosing to attend business school. It might very well be that these individuals'
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a choice of sector, since most teachers work in the public sector and a majority of
business school graduates work in the private sector.
4.2 The consumption value of teacher's college.
Teaching used to be considered a noble profession, and as late as in the 1960's
many considered teaching a calling!", and admission requirements were strict. It is
remarkable that teaching was such a popular profession, given that teachers had
modest salaries compared with many other jobs available to skilled individuals'".
One reason for this is that the gender wage discrimination was small among teachers,
and that it was a profession easier for women to combine with raising children.
Women go in and out of the labor force more frequently than men and, in addition,
few women attended business school in the 1960's. Thus only males are considered
here.
The remaining explanation for the high popularity of teacher's college is the
high consumption value of this educational type. Teacher's college covers a broad
range of different subjects, where the students themselves choose which to specialize
in, according to their interests. Also, this field of study is considered to be less
demanding and time consuming than many others, leaving more time for leisure
and extra curricular activities during the education!". After completed education,
teacher's college graduates can expect to have more leisure time, since teachers have
longer holidays. Teachers can get jobs all over the country, and are not bound to
live in the larger cities, as are many other of the highly educated individuals, and
this might play an important role for individuals planning to live in particular areas.
preferences are such that they have a high consumption value from attending business school.
Here we look at the issue from the point of view of the individuals who actually chose teachers'
college, even though they could have attended business school and increased their lifetime income
substantially (as is shown later in this paper). These individuals most certainly expected a positive
consumption value of education that was at least as large as the difference in the expected wage
returns to the two kinds of education.
15The author's own observations by reading arhived letters to the admission board.
16SeeAarrestad (1969).
17This is here defined as a part of the consumptiton value, since the individual enjoys having a
more relaxed life and being able to pursue his other interests. But it might as well be defined as a
part of the investment costs, since it means that the teacher's college student needs to invest less
effort to graduate than his business school counterpart.
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The individuals choosing teacher's college have such a high consumption value of
this education that they willingly give up the future wage return they could have
achieved by choosing another type of education.
Business school is another field of study!" that requires a high grade level from
high school in order to be admitted. During the 1960's the admission requirements
were just as strict for both these fields of study!", but the wage return to business
school was superior to that to teacher's college, as pointed out by Aarrestad (1969,
1972). Even though the teacher's college graduates could have attended business
school and had a higher wage return, they still chose to attend teacher's college.
Hence they were willing to forgo future wages in order to enjoy the consumption
value of teacher's college.Of course, they could have chosen other fields of study as
well, but business schoolis chosenas a benchmark because it has the same admission
requirements.
We now apply the model developed in the previous section to calculate W, the
lower limit of the teacher's collegegraduates willingnessto pay for the consumption
value of teacher's collegein the 1960's. A unique Norwegian panel data set provides
very complex information on all these individuals. Unfortunately, there is no infor-
mation on actual working experience for the individuals in question, and thus the
potential experience approach of Mincer is applied. Define potential experience, Xp,
for each year as the age of the individual minus the age at school enrollment minus
the duration of the education minus a year for mandatory military service. Both
the expected price of the consumption value of teacher's college at the time of the
educational choice and the actual price these individuals finally paid are calculated.
4.3 Measuring the ex-ante price of the consumption value
of teacher's college.
The 1970 household census holds information on among other things educational
type, gross earnings, and age for all Norwegian adults. Utilizing this information,
the earnings by experience profiles for individuals with teacher's college and busi-
ness school are estimated. These cross-section wage profiles are interpreted as the
18Business school was attended directly after high school and had a duration of three years
during the 1960's. It was expanded to a four year duration in 1975.
19Seethe appendix for more details.
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Figure 3: 1970 gross wage profiles for males with teacher's college and business
school, by years of potential experience.
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teacher's college and business school attendants' expected future earnings profiles
in the late 1960's.
The estimation approach differs from that of Mincer, since the duration of the
education is fixed. The specification below is estimated separately for each group
using ordinary least squares:
(7)
From the estimation results (reported in figures 7 and 8 in the appendix) we
conclude that even though there are some differences in the return to experience in
favor of business school graduates, the major difference is between the constant a:1
in the two groups. Teacher's collegegraduates actually start their career with gross
earnings 34.7% below that of business school graduates'".
Smoothed versions of the wage profiles for 29 years of work experience from the
1970 census are shown in figure 3. The teacher's college graduates pay a substan-
tial wage premium in order to enjoy the consumption value of their educational
type, and this wage premium increases over their career. The earnings vary more
20The estimation results are here transformed to NOK before finding the wage gap between the
two groups.
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Figure 4: Present values of 29 years worth of labor experience in thousand 1970-
NOK, calculated from the avemge earnings of males at different levels of working
experience in the 1970-cencus. These are the gross expected averoge lifetime
earnings of individuals choosing teacher's college and business school in the 1960's.
DIscount rate; ~ ra ~ ~ ~ ra r&
Business school: 1345 1164 1015 892 789 702 629
Teacher's college: 831 719 627 550 487 433 388
Expected price on teacher's
college as a consumption
good: 514 445 388 341 302 269 241
Expec:ted price as percentage 38.2 38.2 38.2 38.3 38.3 38.3 38.3of poIentiallncome:
among business school graduates than among teacher's college graduates. This may
to some extent be due to the fact that most teachers work in the public sector where
the wage level is set by centralized negotiations. The government is the employer
and exercises monopsony power, since the private labor market for teachers is very
limited. Business school graduates, on the other hand, mostly work in the private
sector, where wage negotiations are local and the wage structure is more flexible.
The earnings of the business school graduates constitute the potential total in-
come for the teacher's college graduates. Hence their minimum willingness to pay for
the consumption value of teacher's college is the market compensating wage differ-
ential. The start up wage differential is 34.7 %21 of the teacher's college graduates'
potentiallifetime income. But as the wage differential increases over the career, one
would expect the present value of the life time wage differential to be higher. The
exact size of this wage premium is not available directly from this estimation.
By applying the average wage at alllevels of experience, the present value of the
lifetime income22 can be calculated for both business school graduates and teacher's
21This is in line with Aarrestad's (1969) results from his small sample survey in 1967.
22Assume here that the duration of the working period of the individual is 29 years. The reason
why this exact period is chosen, is that there are few observations in the sample with longer
potential working experience. This is to a great extent due to the early classes of business school
being small.
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college graduates. The results are shown in the table in figure 4, calculated at differ-
ent discount rates. Independent of the discount rate, the wage gap between the two
groups is substantial. Teacher's college gmduates pay a price for the consumption
value of their education in the size of 38 % of the present value of their potential
gross lifetime income.
These are gross wages and, as previously discussed, the presence of a progressive
income would tax most likely reduce the wage gap and thus the price on teacher's
college as a consumption good. The existence of a substantial willingness to pay for
the consumption value of teacher's college is still non-dismissable.
Some objections. Only annual earnings are available in the data. Hence part of
the wage gap might be due to differences in hours worked instead of wage differences.
There are no tuition fees at Norwegian universities, but the students still have
to finance their living expenses. The existence of publicly provided and subsidized
student loans eliminates, or at least reduces, the liquidity constraints that might oth-
erwise be present. For most of the 1960's teacher's college had a two-year duration,
while business school had a three-year duration. Thus, the major cost of acquir-
ing higher education, namely forgone labor income, is higher for business school
graduates. Therefore part of the wage gap between the two educational types is
compensation for the higher investment costs of business school.
The different duration of the two educational types also matters if the individual
has a high discount rate. He then wants to start earning money as soon as possible,
which might induce him to choose teacher's college rather than business school.
Geographical differences might matter. During the 1960's there were teacher's
colleges allover the country, and the individual who disliked moving had a good
chance of finding a teacher's college close to home. Business school, on the other
hand, for a long time only existed in Bergen (The Norwegian School of Economics
and Business Administration), but later another school was founded in Oslo (The
Norwegian School of Management). This could also induce the individual to choose
teacher's college over business school.
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4.4 Measuring the ex-post price of the consumption value
of teacher's college.
The previous section estimated the ex-ante willingness to pay for the consumption
value of teacher's college among the individuals acquiring their education in the
1960's. Did these individuals end up paying a higher or lower price than expected
for this consumption value?
We now estimate the actual wage profiles of all individuals attending and grad-
uating from business school and teacher's college during the 1960's. By combining
the earnings register and the core administrative register we have information on
each individual's income from 1967 to 2000, along with rich information including
factors such as educational type, graduation date, and birth date. Each individual
now has several entries in the created cross section set of annual earnings per year
of potential experience. Apply the same empirical specification as in equation (7),
but followingKlette and Møen (2002), this time use a random effect regression
to estimate the return to potential experience separately for the two educational
groups. The estimation results are reported in figures 9 and 10 in the appendix, and
smoothed wage profiles for the two groups are drawn in figure 5.
It is clear that the ex-post wage profiles differ quite a lot from the ex-ante wage
profiles. It is rather surprising, though, that the wage gap at the beginning of the
career is smaller than predicted. The teacher's collegegraduates started their careers
with annual gross earnings 20.6% belowthat of the business schoolgraduates, where
the corresponding ex-ante wage gap was 34.7 %. But business school graduates
experienced rapid wage increases over their careers, relative to the teacher's college
graduates, as is clearly seen in figure 5. This would have a large impact on the
present value of the two groups' lifetime income.
Since the wage differential increases heavily over the years, the present values of
the two groups' actuallifetime income depends on which discount rate is chosen,
as shown in the table in figure 6. The more weight the individual puts on future
earnings, the lower his discount rate, and the higher the price of the consumption
value of teacher's collegemeasured in forgonepotential income.The ex-post price on
the consumption value of teacher's collegeis between 45 % and 48 % of the individ-
uals' potentiallifetime income, depending on the discount rate. This is substantially
higher than the ex-ante price of 38% of their potentiallifetime income. Someof the
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Figure 5: The actual deflated gross wage profiles of individuals attending teacher's
college and business school in the 1960's, by years of potential experience after grad-
uation.
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reason for these high wage differentials might be that observations from the 1980's
are included in the sample, a period where the private sector enjoyed high wage
increases relative to the public sector.
The ex-ante wage profileswere estimated on cross-sectiondata from 1970,while
the ex-post wage profiles were estimated as cross-section variation between indi-
viduals observed over 29 years. During this time period, the tax system changed
several times, both changing the tax base as well as the marginal tax rates. The
higher the marginal tax rates in the higher income brackets, the more one would
expect the net of taxes wage gap between the two groups to be reduced. Still, even
though the marginal tax rates have been reduced over the years, the tax base has
been broadened, such that it is not possible to say whether these reduced marginal
tax rates increased the net of tax wage differentials or not. A thorough analysis is
required to answer this, and that is left for future research. The main objective of
this paper is to establish as a fact that individuals have high willingnessto pay for
the consumption value of education, rather than to find the exact size of this net of
taxes willingnessto pay.
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Figure 6: Present values of 29 years worth of labor experience in thousand 1970-
NOK, calculated at different discount rotes. These are the actual average gross
lifetime earnings of individuals choosing teacher's college and business school in
the 1960's. Data from the earnings and pension registers, only males.
Discount rate: 2% ~ ~ ~ !%. ~ ~
Business school: 1734 1486 1283 1116 978 863 767
Teachers college: 896 777 679 597 529 472 423
Actual price on taacher's collega
as a consumption good: 837 709 604 519 449 391 343
Actual price as percentage of 48.3 47.7 47.1 46.5 45.9 45.3 44.8potantlallncome:
Further objections. The estimated wage gaps do not account for the fact that
teachers are provided with a public sector retirement insurance, while these retire-
ment insurances vary in both extent and quality in the private sector. If pension
benefits had been included in the earnings profiles, it might be that the wage gap
between the two groups had been smaller.
We have to some extent controlled for heterogeneity in ability among individuals
by comparing two types of educations with the same cut-offgrade levelrequirements
fromhigh school.But it is not certain that the upward ability distribution is the same
in the two groups, such that some heterogeneity might still exist. Teachers mostly
get the same wage independent of performance, while wages are more individual
specific in the private sector. Hence the wage incentives to choose business school
are higher the more skilled the individual.
Also, the approach in this paper corrects for the level of the innate abilities,
but not the difference in types of ability. Willis and Rosen (1979) found that a
person chooses the kind and length of education that maximize his income. They
only consider monetary income, but the results may also be interpreted to include
non-monetary income. This means that a good lawyer would not necessarily have
made a good plumber, and that the individuals maximize their income and utility
according to their abilities and preferences-" Both teacher's college and business
23This is in contrast to the one-factor-ability-as-IQ literature that says that the best lawyers
would also have made the best plumbers.
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school are still pretty much all-round types of educations, with a broad range of
different subjects. Also, admissions are made based on the average grade level from
high school, meaning that the students need good all-round skills.
5 Conclusion.
This paper argues for the existence of an individual specific consumption value of
education, both during the education and after its completion, and for which the
individual is willing to pay. A method for measuring the willingness to pay for the
consumption value of education where the innate ability bias is corrected for is
suggested in a compensating differentials framework.
On rich Norwegian cross section data it is estimated that the individuals who
attended teacher's college in Norway during the 1960's expected to start their first
job with annual earnings 34.7 % below their potential earnings. The full ex-ante
price for the consumption value of teacher's college is estimated to be 38 % of the
present value of the individual's potential lifetime income.
Utilizing a full coverage panel data set on the Norwegian population it is esti-
mated that the teacher's collegegraduates in fact started up their first job earning
"only" 20.6% less than the business school graduates. Howeverthese wage differen-
tials increased over time. The ex-post price on the consumption value to teacher's
college during the 1960's turned out to be about 46 % of the present value of the
individuals' potentiallifetime income.
The goal of the paper has not been to find an exact value of the willingness to
pay for the consumption value of education, but rather to establish as a fact that the
consumption value of education does exist and that it is an important factor behind
the individual's educational choice. As the example shows, many individuals are
willing to give up substantial future wage returns in order to acquire the education
of their choice.Therefore, the consumption value of education should not be ignored
when modeling the individual's educational choice and estimating the return to
education.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Documentation of admission requirements.
It is a general perception that during the 1960's it was just as difficult to be admitted
to teacher's college as to business school in Norway. Aarrestad (1969) stated24 on
page 69: "The demand for teacher's college education far exceeds the supply. The mini-
mum requirement for admission has the last years been above 60 grade points (from high
school)." Also, on page 75 he states: "The admission requirements for the Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration are not quite clear. With maximum
awarded additional points, it is today possible to be admitted with about 60 grade points
from high school."
It proved difficult to find formal evidence for these admittance requirements. In
the archives of the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration'"
and of the Teacher's Council/" I found indications that the last student admitted
to teacher's college and to business school had about the same grade levels, but no
official statistics are available on this issue. Another problem with comparing the
two is that the different institutions had different regulations for giving so-called
additional points to the applicants, such that their total competitive grade score
varied from their high school graduation grade score. Additional points were awarded
for previous education and work experience, and for extracurricular activities, but
the praxis varied among the institutions.
7.2 Data
The 1970 Household Census covers all Norwegian households and individuals
(identified by their personal identification number). The census contains information
on among other things on gross income, sex, age, marital status, type and level of
education, and personal income.
24The following quotations are translated from Norwegian.
25For a long time this was the only business school in Norway, but at the and of the 1960's
another one was founded as well.
26From about 1967 admission to all teacher's colleges in Norway was organized centrally by the
Teacher's Council (Lærerutdanningsrådet). Before that time the admission was organized byeach
school, and the requirements varied from school to school.
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The Earnings Register covers all Norwegian adults and contains gross indi-
vidual earnings based on pension rights earned over the period 1967-2000.
The Core Administrative Register contains information on all Norwegiansin
the years 1986-2000.It has amongmany other variables age, sex, marital status, type
and length of highest completed education, graduation date. The income history of
the individuals can be extended by including the earnings history of the individuals
from the earnings register.
The cleaned sample for calculation of the ex-ante wage profiles. Individ-
uals with missing observations on either educational type or income are removed
from the sample. Beyond that all individuals who graduated from teacher's college
or business school in the period 1941-1970are included in the sample, in order to
estimate the full income profile for 0-29 years of working experience in 1970for the
two groups. Even individuals who for some reason were not active in the labor force
are included. When a young person makes his educational choice, the future wage
return is uncertain for many reasons, and one of them is that he might become ill
and be unable to work. If one type of education leads to more stressful jobs than
the other, more individuals will become ill, and the wage level while still at work
needs to be higher in order to compensate for this. Hence the income of those not
currently in the labor force in 1970, but with potentiallabor experience between O
and 29 years, needs to be included to get the full picture.
The full sample ofmales in the 1970censuscounts 2269business schoolgraduates
and 7089 teacher's collegegraduates.
The cleaned sample for calculation of the ex-post wage profiles. The first
challengewas to identify who acquired the two educational types during the 1960's,
as well as to find their potential working experience. In principle, I could use the
graduation date in the core administrative register to establish when the individual
most likelystarted working, and thus find the potential working experience in years.
Unfortunately, all who completed their education prior to November 1970are listed
with this as their graduation date. Therefore I use their date of birth, add 19 years
(to complete high-school) to find the time when they most likelystarted their higher
education, and add another 2 or 3 years to find graduation date. Finally I added
another year for the mandatory military service (some did this before and others
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after their education, but most did it before they started working) to find when they
most likely started their professional careers.
This procedure identified the individuals acquiring their education during the
1960's, as well as their entry into the labor force. By merging the core administrative
data with the earnings register, I got the gross income series for these individuals
from 1967 to 2000. From this the earnings history of the individuals from O to 29
years of potential experience was extracted.
When the panel was cleaned for entries missing information on annual earnings,
the final sample consisted of 465 business school graduates with a total of 13110
observation entries, and 1805 teacher's college graduates with a total of 50153 ob-
servation entries.
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Source 1 df MS
Figure 7: Results, ordinary least squares regression, teachers, 1970-census.
SS-------------+------------------------------
Modell 678.480338 2 339.240169
Residuall 1741.66185 7086 .245789141~------------+------------------------------
Total I 2420.14219 7088 .341442183
Number of obs
F( 2, 70861
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
7089
1380.21
0.0000
0.2803
0.2801
.49577
lnW 1 Coet. Std. Err. t P>ltl [95% Conf. Interval]-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
pexp 1 .0958324 .0026617 36.00 0.000 .0906146 .1010501
sqpexp 1 -.0024115 .0001008 -23.93 0.000 -.002609 -.002214
_cons 1 9.796686 .0126202 776.27 0.000 9.771947 9.821426
census.
Figure 8: Results, ordinary least squares regression, business school gmduates, 1970-
Source 1 df MSSS
-------------+------------------------------
Modell 263.700785 2 131.850392
Residuall 552.728836 2266 .243922699
-------------+------------------------------
Total 1 816.429621 2268 .359977787
lnW 1 Coef. Std. Err. t
Number of obs
F ( 2, 2266)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
2269
540.54
0.0000
0.3230
0.3224
.49389
P>ltl [95% Conf. Interval]-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
pexp 1 .0999329 .0043521 22.96 0.000 .0913984 .1084674
sqpexp 1 -.0025426 .0001625 -15.64 0.000 -.0028613 -.0022238
_cons 1 10.22356 .0222558 459.37 0.000 10.17992 10.26721
Figure 9: Results, mndom effects regression, teachers, earnings register.
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs 50153
Group variable (i) : pid Number of groups 1805
R-sq: within 0.2680 Obs per group: min 1
between 0.0206 avg 27.8
overall 0.2021 max = 33
Random effects u- - Gaussian Wald chi2(2) 17749.49corr{u_i, X) O (assumed) Prob > chi2 0.0000
lnW 1 Coef. Std. Err. P>lzl [95% Conf. Interval]
pexp I
sqpexp 1
_cons 1
.0783991
-.0018876
9.94585
98.34
-73.24
1255.63
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
.0799617
-.0018371
9.961375
.0007973
.0000258
.007921
0.000
0.000
0.000
.0768365
-.0019382
9.930326-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
sigma u .25123219
sigma=e I .357633
rho I .33042589 (fraction of variance due to u i)
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Figure 10: Results, mndom effects regression, business school gmduates, earnings
register.
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs 13110
Group variable (i) : pid Number of groups 465
R-sq: within 0.3778 Obs per group: min 13
between 0.0593 avg 28.2
overall 0.3069 max 30
Random effects u_i - Gaussian Wald chi2(2) 7694.71
corr(u_if X) = O (assumed) Prob > chi2 0.0000
lnW I Coef. Std. Err. z P>lzl [95% Conf. Interval]-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
pexp I .1192716 .0020061 59.45 0.000 .1153397 .1232035
sqpexp I -.0027991 .0000687 -40.75 0.000 -.0029337 -.0026645
_cons I 10.17645 .0185267 549.28 0.000 10.14014 10.21276-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
sigma u I .29900569
sigma-e I .4930236
rho I .26890429 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
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